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INTRODUCTION 
 
“…Indonesia is one of the most important States of South East Asia, having a population of 
72 million. It has the largest Moslem population on the world. Economically, politically, and 
strategically, it occupies a key position in international politics. Secondly, it may in a sense be 
said to be the child of the United Nations.”1 
With this statement, the representative of India requested the Security Council (SC) to discuss 
the admission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations (UN). During this particular 
meeting, a turbulent period came to its end. A period in which the former Netherlands Indies 
became a sovereign and independent state. The process towards independency did not go 
smoothly. The dispute between the Netherlands and the self-acclaimed Indonesian Republic 
escalated into an armed conflict and the SC was asked to take action in order to cease 
hostilities. Years full of meetings, resolutions, commissions, agreements, violations of these 
agreements and the establishment of new agreements followed the first cease-fire order. These 
years of hard work resulted in the transfer of sovereignty at the end of 1949 and UN 
membership in the autumn of 1950.  
  The discussions in the SC were marked by the different opinions about the manner in 
which the Council was obliged to take action considering the Indonesian dispute. Several 
members were of opinion that the right of self-determination of the Indonesian people was 
being repressed by the, in the first stadium, British- and later on, at a larger scale, the 
Netherlands forces. On the other side, the Netherlands authorities were of opinion that the SC, 
by taking action, was interfering in the internal affairs of the sovereign Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. The members that were supporting the right to self-determination of the 
Republic were basing their arguments on Article 1.3 of the first Chapter of the Charter of the 
UN, which talked about developing friendly relations between nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
2
 However, in Article 2.1 and 
2.7 of the same Chapter, the principle of sovereign equality and the non-intervention in 
matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of a state were included.
3
  
                                                          
1
 United Nations Security Council Official Records (UNSCOR), 503rd meeting (26 September 1950), 12 
2
 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, Article 1.2: “To develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures 
to strengthen universal peace.” 
3
 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, Article 2.1: “The Organisation is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its members.”; and, Article 2.7: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
5 
 
  Because of the inclusion of both the principle of sovereignty and the principle of self-
determination in the Charter of the UN a field of tension evolved between the two principles. 
The Indonesian Question was the first case of decolonization that came before the SC, in 
which the principles of self-determination and sovereignty appeared to be of major 
importance. Therefore, researching the Indonesian question would be a great opportunity to 
analyse the development of the two principles in relation to each other during the discussions 
in the SC concerning the Indonesian dispute. In order to be able to come to a conclusion about 
the development of the two principles during the Indonesian dispute the question which must 
be asked is: what role was played by the principles of self-determination and sovereignty in 
the discussions before the SC that contributed to the settlement of the Indonesian dispute in 
1945-1950?   
  The answer to this question could provide for a better insight of the development of 
the provisions of the Charter of the UN It will give an understanding in the growing 
difference between theory and practise during the first years of the SC. Next to that, this 
research will show the influence of the changing era of decolonisation on international 
relations and world organization. On the other side, it will put the Indonesian dispute in the 
broader context of the development of world government and international relations. 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Works that describe and analyse the Indonesian struggle for independence appeared in a lot of 
different shapes and forms. The Dutch works were especially acquainted by the military 
actions that were executed by the Netherlands forces.
4
 On the other side, the economic and 
cultural developments have been analysed also.
5
 The struggle as a whole was often recorded 
by the means of exhaustive books that merely described the development and outcome of the 
conflict.
6
 Other works focused on the foreign influence on the dispute.
7
 However, most of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” 
4
 René Kok, Louis Zweers and Erik Somers, Koloniale oorlog: 1945-1949: Van Indië naar Indonesië 
(Amsterdam, 2009); Stef Scagliola, Last van de oorlog: De Nederlandse oorlogsmisdaden in Indonesië en hun 
verwerking (Amsterdam, 2002); J.J.P. de Jong, Avondschot: Hoe Nederland zich terugtrok uit zijn Aziatisch 
imperium (Amsterdam, 2011); Frans Glissenaar, Indië verloren, rampspoed geboren (Hilversum, 2003) 
5
 Els Bogaerts and Remco Raben (ed.), Van Indië tot Indonesië (Amsterdam, 2007); H.W. van den Doel, 
Afscheid van Indië: de val van het Nederlandse imperium in Azië (Amsterdam 2000) 
6
 George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca 1952); Anthony Reid, The 
Indonesian National Revolution, 1945-1950 (Hawthorn, 1974) 
7
 Ruth T. McVey, The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution, A study in the Russian Attitude Towards Asian 
Nationalism (Ithaca, 1957); Marc Frey, Ronald W. Pruessen, and Tan Tai Yong (ed.), The Transformation of 
Southeast Asia, International Perspectives on Decolonization (Armonk 2003); Frances Gouda with Thijs 
Brocades Zaalbers, American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia, U.S. foreign policy and 
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them left aside the SC as a major actor in the dispute. Just a few works analysed the 
Indonesian question in relation to the UN. Two of these works were written by UN officials 
who worked also with the Indonesian dispute.
8
 These works were merely written within 10 or 
20 years after the settlement of the dispute and lack a certain broader viewpoint and particular 
focus. This research will close the gap by placing the Indonesian struggle for independence in 
the broader context of the development of sovereignty and self-determination in the 
discussion before the SC. 
  The development of the principles of sovereignty and self-determination has also been 
researched in a comprehensive manner. The tension between the two principles is apparent in 
the literature that is written about them. Many writers gave the UN a distinctive role in the 
development of self-determination in international relations and law. However, as much 
writers acknowledged that, besides decolonisation, self-determination cannot be seen as a 
positive right. Frederic Kirgis searched in his article, ‘The degrees of self-determination in the 
UN’ era’,9 for the possibility of granting a right to self-determination to peoples in a system of 
international law that is based on the principle of sovereignty. He stated that it depends on the 
stability of a regime. Yehuda Blum wrote in his article, ‘Reflections on the changing concept 
of self-determination’,10 about the development of the principle in relation to the principle of 
sovereignty. He started at the Wilsonian moment and ended with the implication of the right 
of self-determination for ‘all peoples. Michla Pomerance also analysed the development of 
self-determination in her article, ‘Self-determination today: the metamorphosis of an ideal.’11 
He wrote not only about the problems that evolved around the implementation of self-
determination, but wrote also about the manner in which the UN applied to the principle. 
Pomerance held the view that the UN had a preference for a territorial manner of practising 
the principle, especially regarding the colonial peoples. Helen Quane reacted in her article, 
‘The United Nations and the evolving right to self-determination’, on this territorial manner 
and states that the problem is somewhat more nuanced. There were also cases to find that did 
not show this preference. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Indonesian Nationalism, 1920-1949 (Amsterdam 2002); Richard McMillan, The British Occupation of 
Indonesia:1945-1946: Britain, The Netherlands and the Indonesian Revolution (Oxon, 2005) 
8
 J.F. Collins, “The United Nations and Indonesia,” International Organisation 115 (1950): 37-56; A.M. Taylor, 
Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, (London 1960). 
9
 F. L. Kirgis, “The degrees of self-determination in the United Nations era,” The American Journal of 
International Law 88:2 (April 1994): 304-310. 
10
 Y. Z. Blum, “Reflections on the Changing Concept of Self-determination,” Israel Law Review 10 (1975): 509-
514 
11
 M. Pomerance, “Self-determination today: the metamorphosis of an ideal,” Israel Law Review 19 (1984): 310-
339 
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  These writers, among others,
12
 all started their analysis of self-determination and 
decolonisation with General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960) that proclaims that all peoples 
have the right to self-determination. However, the Indonesian dispute shows that the UN was 
already acquainted with the principle of self-determination and decolonisation at the 
beginning of its practice. During the first meetings of the SC the members were stating that 
the era of colonialism and imperialism had ended and that the principle of self-determination 
was a main principle within the Charter of the UN.
13
 The literature did not refer to this early 
point in the evolvement of the UN and its relation to the right of self-determination. 
  Mark Mazower, though, wrote in his book, ‘No Enchanted Palace: The end of empire 
and the ideological origins of the United Nations,’14 about this early period of the UN. He 
stressed that the UN was in the first place not at all an organisation that would make a great 
effort in the process of decolonisation. Many of its founders still believed that the colonies 
would provide a quick recovery from the incurred damage from the Second World War. 
However, Mazower based his resource mainly on the many different actors that were 
acquainted by the establishment of the UN, instead of researching the practice of the UN in 
cases like the Indonesian dispute.  
  Martti Koskenniemi, in contrast, did write about the practice of the UN and especially 
the SC in his article, ‘The Police in the temple: order, justice and the UN: A dialective view.’ 
In this article he compared the practice of the SC with the theory of the Charter. He stated that 
the SC was lacking authority and decisiveness in following up its resolutions and doing its 
tasks by providing solutions for situations that threaten peace and security all over the world. 
However, Koskenniemi wrote mainly about the later practice of the SC, but stresses a 
phenomenon that was already expressed in the discussions about Indonesia.  
  The research of this thesis will provide an extension to the literature about the 
Indonesian dispute, which will place the dispute in a wider development within international 
relations. It will provide a better insight in the development of decolonisation in relation to the 
UN and the SC regarding the principles of sovereignty and self-determination and it will give 
                                                          
12
 See also: R. Emerson, “Self-determination,” The American Journal of International Law 65 (1971): 459-475; 
M.C. Lâm, “Making room for peoples at the United Nations: Thoughts provoked by Indigenous claims to self-
determination,” Cornell International Law Journal 15 (1992): 603-622; M. Koskenniemi, “National Self-
determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
43 (1994): 241-269; C. Eagleton, “Self-determination in the United Nations,” The American Journal of 
International Law, 47:1 (January 1953): 88-93: N. Berman, “Sovereignty in Abeyance: self-determination and 
international law,” Wisconsin International Law Journal 7 (1988-1989): 51-105 
13
 UNSCOR, 14
th
 mtg., 206-207 
14
 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations 
(Oxford 2008) 
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an idea about the difference between the letter of the Charter and the eventual implementation 
of this Charter by the SC concerning sovereignty and self-determination.    
The sources upon which this research will be based are the verbatim records of the United 
Nations Security Council Meetings.
15
 These documents provide a lively and extensive image 
of the discussions among the members of the SC. The Indonesian Question was issued by the 
Council from the first time it was called together until it decided upon the recommendation 
for admission of the Republic of Indonesia to membership of the UN. The speeches given by 
the representatives show the different opinions of the members of the Council regarding the 
Indonesian question, but the records also show the struggles of a new international body with 
the rightful implementation of the charters and the search for the correct way of procedure.  
  The fact that the Republic of Indonesia was also invited to participate in the 
discussions before the SC, provides for an even broader view on the different standpoints in 
the SC towards the Indonesian dispute. It gives also an insight into how a dependent colony 
was able to use the Council in search for its independence and in contrast the failure of the 
Netherlands delegation to do the same. 
METHOD   
The analysis of these sources in order to find an answer to the main question of this research 
enquires a proper understanding of the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. The 
first chapter will provide an analysis of these two concepts.  
  The second and third chapter will give an analysis of the debates in the SCin order to 
determine the role which the concepts of self-determination and sovereignty did play in the 
debates. In order to be able to analyse the debates it is needed to identify the different actors 
which had a major influence on the debates and also on the ways of use of the concepts of 
self-determination and sovereignty. In order to define this influence and the ways of use of the 
two concepts it is necessary to analyse the interaction of these actors. Therefore, the 
identification and the analysis of the interaction of the actors will be presented in chapter two. 
In order to make this analysis a method will be used that is practised in social psychology to 
analyse conflict situations. This method identifies three different roles actors can adjust 
regarding a situation of conflict, the victim, rescuer and prosecutor. It is called the Drama 
                                                          
15
 Security Council Official Records, First Year (1946), Meetings 2, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18; Second Year 
(1947), Meetings 171, 172, 173, 174, 178, 181, 184, 185, 187, 192, 193, 194, 195, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 
212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 222, 224, 225; Third Year (1948), Meetings 247, 248, 249, 251, 252, 
256, 259, 316, 322, 323, 326, 328, 329, 341, 342, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 395, 396; Fourth Year (1949) 
Meetings 397, 398, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 455, 456; Fifth Year 
(1950) meeting 503. 
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Triangle and founded by Stephen B. Karpman in 1968.
16
 The Drama Triangle is used in two 
different disciplines of psychological science, structural analysis and transactional analysis. 
Structural analysis attends to the matter of defining the conflict roles and transactional 
analysis discuss the switching of roles by the actors during the conflict. In this thesis the 
concept of the Drama Triangle will be used in particular for structural analysis of the debates 
in the SC. It will occur that some actors switch their roles. Although, this will not be the main 
focus of the research. The debates in the SC about the Indonesian Question showed the same 
dynamic as a conflict situation that is analysed by means of the Drama Triangle. The 
discussion in the SC will be looked upon if it is the conflict situation, instead of the whole 
Indonesian dispute. The representatives of the different countries in the SC, including the non-
members that were participating in the discussion, will be looked upon if they are persons 
dealing with a situation of conflict 
  Following the analysis of the main actors and their interaction by means of the roles of 
the Drama Triangle, chapter three will discuss the different viewpoints and ways of use of the 
concepts of self-determination and sovereignty. The identification of the different actors by 
means of ascribing roles to these and their interaction because of these roles, will provide a 
base on which the ways of using the two concepts can be analysed. It will be shown that each 
role will approach and use the two concepts differently. The analysis of these different 
viewpoints and ways of use will provide for an answer to the main question: what role was 
played by the principles of self-determination and sovereignty in the discussions before the 
SC that contributed to the settlement of the Indonesian dispute in 1945-1950?     
  
                                                          
16
 Stephen B. Karpman, “Fairy Tales and Script Drama Analysis”, Transactional Analysis Bulletin, 7: 26 (1968), 
39-43 
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1. SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-
DETERMINATION 
 
The two concepts of sovereignty and self-determination are known for their long and turbulent history. 
Since the beginning of international relations, the concept of sovereignty has been an important 
principle of international law and relations. Sovereignty was in the first place a principle that belonged 
to the King or Queen of a territory. Legitimacy was an important factor regarding this sovereignty. 
Legitimacy was based on lineage. The territory of a state was the heritage of the emperor and could be 
extended by way of marriage or conquest.  
  As the populations of territories started to demand more participation in the administration of 
their country, the status quo of international relations changed. The legitimacy of the sovereign 
administration shifted from lineage to popular consent. The French Revolution, the Glorious 
Revolution, and the American Revolution are examples of the rise of this popular consent. These 
revolutions represent the first expressions of the principle of self-determination within a political 
entity. By that time self-determination was often referred to as the sovereignty of the people. The 
absolute power to rule over a territory by an emperor became outdated, but the principle of self-
determination was limited by the boundaries of the territory in which it was executed.
17
 
  The principle of self-determination appeared in international relations during the First World 
War in the war-time speeches of President Woodrow Wilson. In his  fourteen points he presented his 
vision on the new world order that had to be implemented after the end of the war. These fourteen 
points contained government by consent. The administration of a country must represent the interests 
of the inhabitants of the territory.
18
 Wilson, however, was not in favour of self-government for colonial 
people all over the world. His idea of self-determination was preferably projected at the re-division of 
Europe.  During the Paris Peace Conference, it was determined where the new boundaries of the 
European countries were placed. In some areas, especially in border zones between countries, 
plebiscites were held to figure out the popular will. In this manner, the international community was 
for the first time concerned with self-determination of certain peoples in certain areas. However, the 
involvement was limited to specifically the countries in Europe and some other parts of the world.
19
 
  Despite this, people from all over the world came to Paris and tried to schedule a meeting with 
Wilson to discuss self-government for their people. The majority of these peoples came from colonial 
territories. Often, these people had to leave Paris without ever talking to President Wilson. Self-
                                                          
17
 E. J. Kolla, “The French Revolution, “The Union of Avignon, and the Challenges of National Self-
Determination,” Law History Review 31:4 (November 2013) 717 
18
 E. Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial 
Nationalism, (Oxford 2007) 22. 
19
 Idem 24-25 
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determination was not a right which colonial people were entitled to.
20
 
  With the ending of the Second World War this perception changed. The rise of the United 
States and the decline of the European Empires caused a new world order in which the new main 
power had a fundamental aversion towards colonialism. Because of this aversion, administering a 
colonial territory was not wide-spread accepted anymore and voices to free dependent peoples were 
heard more often. A crucial role was played by the UN,  and its primary body, the SC. In 1960 a 
resolution was adopted by the General Assembly that proclaimed the right to self-determination for all 
peoples in the world, specifically the colonial peoples. However, the UN firmly expressed their 
disapproval for the secession of States. Despite the emphasis on colonial people, international law 
professionals are still debating the merits of the right to self-determination of all peoples.
21
    
  This chapter will explain in general the definitions of the two concepts and the debate that was 
caused by the entering of the right to self-determination in international relations that were based upon 
the cardinal principle of sovereignty   
SOVEREIGNTY 
The history of the principles of sovereignty and self-determination show that the two concepts have 
many faces and are not independent of each other. In order to understand the complicated relationship 
between the two concepts, it is important to come to a definition of the two concepts. With regard to 
the historical sequence of the concepts, the definition of sovereignty will be analysed at first. 
  The most standard definition of sovereignty is described as the authority, which is recognized 
by internal and external factors, to make decisions and to use coercion within the domestic sphere of a 
territory. According to this definition, the concept of sovereignty consists of five essential elements: 
recognition; statehood; authority; coercion; and, territory. Janice Thomson gives in her article about 
state sovereignty in international relations a detailed description and analysis of the different elements 
of sovereignty.
22
 Her starting point is the recognition of the sovereignty of an entity by the 
international community of sovereign states. The element of recognition is preventing states to claim 
sovereignty without really possessing it. The fact that recognition of the sovereignty of a state may be 
subject to the personal agendas of certain other sovereign states causes a few problems. For example, 
how many recognizing sovereign states are required for an entity to become a sovereign power? Is the 
recognition of certain sovereign states indispensable for a world-wide recognition of the sovereign 
status of an entity? A final question that is often asked refers to the conditions which an entity must 
possess in order to receive recognition.
23
 These conditions are similar to the conditions that are 
distinctive for the element of statehood. Because of the distinguishing characteristics of statehood, this 
                                                          
20
 Idem 215 
21
 Blum, “Reflections on the changing concept of self-determination,” 511-512 
22
 J. E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical 
Research,” International Studies Quarterly 39:2 (June 1995) 219. 
23
 Idem, 219-220 
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element will be discussed later. 
  The third element of sovereignty is authority. Authority is the factor that provides the ability to 
dictate the corridors of power of the political entity, the state. It determines which areas are political 
and which areas are private. Within the political area the state is authorized to use coercion in order to 
safeguard the political area.
24
 This coercion is another element of sovereignty. The element of coercion 
is similar to the idea of the monopoly on violence by a state. The military and police forces are placed 
under the authority of the state. It occurs that the state transfers some of its powers of coercion to 
private institutions. However, the state’s sovereignty is not at stake. The decision to transfer these 
kinds of powers stays within the jurisdiction of the sovereign authority in question.
25
    
  Finally, the element of territory is essential for the determination of a sovereign state. All the 
elements discussed above cannot exist without a territory with clearly defined boundaries. The 
international community of states cannot recognize an entity which cannot be determined precisely. 
Authority cannot put into progress without the determination of where this authority ends and coercion 
cannot be operated sufficiently without ambiguous borders.
26 
 
The elements of sovereignty are also distinctive conditions of statehood. Because of this, the element 
of statehood requires some additional attention. It often appears that the concepts of sovereignty and 
statehood are confused with each other or are determined as similar. Like it is described earlier 
sovereignty is seen as an extra addition of statehood, but the following analysis will show that the 
distinction between these two is less straight forward.  
  In determining statehood, the Montevideo convention is regarded as the leading doctrine. This 
convention provides four criteria an entity must comply with to be regarded as a state. These four 
criteria differ slightly from the elements of sovereignty. The first criterion obligates the entity to 
possess a permanent population. A state must consist of people who are citizens that belong to that 
entity. It is logical that without people a state cannot function, therefore territories without population 
cannot be considered as states. The second criterion is the territory in which this permanent population 
is living. Like described before, boundaries are essential for the exercise of authority. The third 
criterion is similar to this authority. It describes the condition that a state must operate an effective 
government. A government that is capable of exercising authority and using coercion. This 
government is also required, and this is the fourth criterion, to have the capacity to engage in 
international relations, to sign treaties and to fulfil the obligations concerning these treaties.
27
  
  In practice it turns out that these four criteria are no exhaustive criteria for the recognition of 
statehood. There are states that exist without complying with these criteria. On the other hand, several 
experts are of the opinion that these four criteria are not comprehensive enough. One of the most 
                                                          
 
24
 Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations,” 222-225 
25
 Idem, 225-227 
26
 Idem, 227-228 
27
 T.D. Grant, “Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents,” Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 37 (1998-1999) 414 
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important conditions of statehood is not included in the Montevideo criteria. This condition is the 
independency of the entity.
28
 However, entities can be recognized as states without acquiring full 
independence. A sovereign state is by definition independent contrary to, for example, states 
belonging to the British Commonwealth who became states before they received general 
independence. A similar example is the composition of the United States of America. The USA is a 
federal entity that consists of 50 states. These states comply with almost all of the criteria but because 
they are constitutional linked with each other by means of a federation; the federation possesses the 
sovereignty and not the individual states. Thus, a sovereign state cannot be constitutional linked with 
another state. Alan James named this condition of sovereignty ‘constitutional independence’. He wrote 
that sovereignty is a condition that is attributed to the state by means of its own constitutional law.
29
 
Thus, the composition of a constitution of a certain state is an act of sovereignty. In contrast with the 
most of the aforementioned criteria of sovereignty, constitutional independence is an internal 
observation of the sovereign status of a state. It is an internal factor which will lead to another extra 
criterion of sovereignty and with that, statehood. An entity must claim to be state and must claim to be 
sovereign in order to get recognized as a state or sovereign power. Without a claim the international 
community of states are not able to recognize a new state.
30
 
The recognition of the statehood of an entity is subject to the era its claim is issued. During the era that 
followed the Second World War, democracy was the form of government the Western world 
preferred. Because of this preference, new criteria were added to the list of conditions the newly 
established states had to acquire in order to get recognized as such. One of these criteria was that the 
claim for statehood must be established out of popular consent. The national aspirations of a territory 
must be supported by the population of that territory. The idea that a newly established state is 
preferred to become a democracy stands in relation to the criterion of popular consent. Without these 
criteria an entity can claim statehood but it will risk the reluctance of the Western Powers regarding 
the recognition of the claim. Without the recognition of the Western Powers and especially the Powers 
that possess a right to veto resolutions in the SC of the UN it is difficult to gain an equal place among 
other states in the international community. With this in mind, some experts add also membership of 
the UN to the list of criteria for statehood. Of course, this criterion is not exclusive. There are states 
that are completely sovereign but did not become members of the UN – Switzerland for example.31  
To conclude the analysis of the concept of sovereignty, it is clear that the concept and especially the 
criteria that are trying to define the concept are subject to change. With time, criteria are added and 
criteria are excluded – like legitimacy through lineage. Criteria like democracy and popular consent 
                                                          
28
 Idem, 437 
29
 A. James, “The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society,” Political Studies 67 
(1999) 460-462 
30
 Grant, “Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents,” 438 
31
 Idem, 440-442 
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gained a more important place in the list of conditions. This change could be connected with the 
growing role of self-determination in the question of statehood and sovereignty.  
SELF-DETERMINATION 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, self-determination gained its place in international 
relations during the First World War. As an addition to the story of the war-time rhetoric of President 
Woodrow Wilson mentioned that the leader of the Soviet Union, Lenin, did use the principle of self-
determination in his fight against the former administration of Russia earlier than Wilson did. With the 
establishment of communism, the principle of self-determination became a tool in a fight for the 
public opinion of Europe. This fact makes it even more understandable that the principle of self-
determination earned its place in the world in such a small amount of time. 
The concept of self-determination can be divided into two forms; internal self-determination and 
external self-determination. Internal self-determination is the exercise of self-determination within the 
boundaries of a state without the involvement of the international community. On the other hand, 
external self-determination is the exercise of self-determination outside the boundaries of a state and 
with the involvement of the international community. An example of internal self-determination is the 
French Revolution or, generally speaking, the privileges of a minority to have its own beliefs and 
customs without state-repression. When dealing with a case of internal self-determination there is no 
secession of a state or establishment of a new state. When dealing with a case of external self-
determination a new state is formed. This last type of self-determination is in conflict with the 
principle of sovereignty and did not fit into the status quo of international relations. 
  The easiest way to define the right of self-determination is to quote the words of Yehuda Blum 
who wrote: the right of self-determination “implies the right of every people to political 
independence.”32 Another straightforward definition is the definition of Rupert Emerson. He stated: “I 
take the right of self-determination to be no more and no less than one aspect of the right of 
revolution.”33 A more detailed description is written by Mikulas Fabry. He wrote: “Self-determination 
of peoples is a liberal idea of international justice that emerged in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. It was rooted in the proposition that a group of people sharing certain social bonds vis-à-vis 
other groups of people has a right to establish, whether within or outside of the borders of the country 
in which it finds itself, alone or in union with other peoples, its own government.”34 
  Like with the concept of sovereignty, self-determination has also a few elements that are 
important in the analysis of its definition. The most important element is the ‘self’, the peoples. Who 
are entitled to exercise the principle of self-determination?  Fabry described in his definition the ‘self’ 
as being a group of people with certain social bonds. He marked explicit that these social bonds had to 
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be different from other groups of people.
35
 These social bonds can imply the race of the people, or the 
presence of a certain culture. In the process of executing the right of self-determination, it is important 
that these social bonds differ from the social bonds of the group of people administrating the territory. 
Otherwise the need for self-government is not important enough to secede. 
  Another element of the right to self-determination is the element of determination. Who is 
going to determine the process towards self-government and who is determining the interests of the 
people that search for independence? Who decides who belongs to the group of people and who does 
not belong? These questions are not answered to exhaustion in any of the research concerning the 
principle of self-determination. Nathaniel Berman showed in his article about self-determination and 
international law that most of the time these questions are difficult to answer in completeness.
36
 
However, the answers to the questions are in some cases important for the execution of a right to self-
determination. Especially since the principle of self-determination is regarded as a positive right in 
international law. In the second and third chapter of this thesis will be shown that these questions were 
important for the Dutch Government regarding the nature of the nationalistic movement in Indonesia.  
  In comparison with the definition of sovereignty, the definition of self-determination appears 
to be rather simple. However, when self-determination becomes a principle in international relations, 
the straightforward definition must become more detailed, which proved to be a very complex 
matter.
37
 To illustrate the difficulty of determining the precise definition of self-determination Frederic 
L. Kirgis made a list of the many faces of the principles: 
1.  The right to be free from colonial domination: this type of self-determination is nowadays -
since the adoption of resolution 1514 by the General Assembly of the UN- an established right 
in international politics. However, during the Indonesian dispute, this right was expressed by 
certain members in the SC but by then it was not an established right yet. 
2. The right to remain dependent: For example, in a situation like this, territories decided to 
remain dependent from a foreign administrator, which would give them a greater advantage 
regarding, for example, international relations, trade, and financial matters.  
3. The right to dissolve a state: The people of one country have the right to decide to split the 
country up in multiple other countries. For example, the dissolution of the Soviet Union into 
multiple other states after the fall of the Berlin wall.  
4. The right to secede: This type of self-determination contains, for example, the expressed wish 
of several Catalonians in Spain who wanted to secede from Spain and establish their own 
state. The right to secede is not supported by, for example, the UN.  
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5. The right of divided states to become one state, to reunite: For example, the unification of East 
and West Germany after the end of the Berlin wall and the Soviet Union.   
6. The right of limited autonomy: For example, the relation of the Caribbean Netherlands with 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands. These countries have their own parliaments but are 
dependent of the Netherlands concerning their foreign affairs and defence.   
7. The rights of minority groups to, for example, speak their own language or practice their own 
believes. The minority protection system that was issued by the League of Nations is an 
example for this type of self-determination. 
8. The internal self-determination of every human being to have the freedom to choose one’s 
own form of government. This type of self-determination contains the right to vote and to 
choose representation in parliament.
38
 
Like it is shown by the eight different faces of self-determination above, the concept of self-
determination can be explained in many different ways. These different ways made it difficult to apply 
the concept of self-determination into international law and relations, because each different face 
requires a different approach. The next paragraph will show this difficulty, in particular when the 
concept of self-determination is placed against the concept of sovereignty.    
THE DEBATE 
The implementation of the principle of self-determination in international politics and law is the 
starting point of the conflict between the principle of sovereignty and the principle of self-
determination. The support for a claim for self-determination by a foreign country is in theory a 
violation of the internal sovereignty of a state. From the beginning of international relations, the 
internal sovereignty of a state has been the basis of international law and politics. 
  Blum describes the difference and relation between the two principles very clear as he links 
the principle of sovereignty to legitimacy and the principle of self-determination to revolution.
39
 The 
idea that legitimacy is contested by another claim, which results into revolution is as old as the 
concepts of statehood and sovereignty. However, besides the old Roman right of resistance, which was 
used to legitimize the Dutch Revolt, revolution was not seen as a right, it was merely a tool. The 
appearance of the right of self-determination in international politics meant in theory an attack to the 
established basis of the principle of sovereignty. If the international community gets involved with the 
principle of self-determination, the internal affairs of sovereign states are at stake. The development of 
the right of self-determination required a new balance between sovereignty and self-determination. A 
new status quo for international relations was needed to handle this question. 
  Many different experts on international law and relations have tried to find a definition of the 
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right of self-determination that fits into the international system without devaluing the principle of 
sovereignty. For example, Kirgis, who made a list of the many faces of self-determination, made also a 
scheme in which the chance that a claim for self-determination is granted recognition is presented. He 
explained that the conditions in which the claim for self-determination is executed are of essential 
value for the chance of recognition of the claim: the factor of stability of the contested government and 
the factor of destabilization of the claim for self-determination. If the contested government is a stable 
government, a destabilizing claim for self-determination is often not recognized. On the other hand, if 
a contested government is less stable, a less destabilizing claim for self-determination is more often 
recognized.
40
 Like it was said before, the definitions of statehood and sovereignty were also subjected 
to stability and developments over time. A good example for these developments is the adoption of the 
UN doctrine ‘Responsibility to Protect’ during the 2005 World Summit to prevent genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The UN stated that “sovereignty no longer 
exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility that holds States 
accountable for the welfare of their people.”41 Sovereignty is no longer only a status, it has become a 
responsibility. Thus, if a sovereign state loses the criterion of responsibility, a claim of self-
determination is worthy of consideration.     
  On the other side, because of the many criteria and exceptions, the question is asked if the 
right of self-determination can be considered as a positive international right. Farby is of opinion that 
the principle of self-determination as a positive right could only be implemented when decolonization 
was involved. He said that implementing self-determination as a positive right substituted the “self-
help-based mode” for a “wish-based mode”.42 Thus, the positive implementation of self-determination 
granted peoples from all over the world, Farby was mentioning colonial people, to wish for self-
government. That wish was no longer a wish that had to be fulfilled by the foreign administrator, but 
was supported by the international community. However, besides the positive right of self-
determination for the colonial communities, the positive right of self-determination for other peoples is 
not established yet. Fabry explained the difference between positive and negative rights concerning the 
principle of self-determination as that “negative rights are claims to secured space in which subjects 
might pursue their own concerns without interference.” This points out that, for example, revolutions 
taking place without the interference of foreign powers. In contrast with the negative rights, “positive 
rights are claims that the space [must] be filled with something.”43 In other words, negative rights 
oblige inaction and positive rights oblige action. If the right of self-determination for all peoples is 
regarded as a positive right in international law, the international community of states, for example the 
UN, will be obliged to take action concerning any claim for self-determination. Because of the 
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aforementioned factors of stability and destabilization, self-determination as a positive right, in 
exception of decolonization, is seen by a lot of experts as an unwanted precedent. 
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
The growing role of the principle of self-determination in international politics was strengthened by 
the establishment of UN and the inclusion of self-determination in the Charter of the UN. The right of 
self-determination became a strong argument for their role as advocates for the suppressed and 
dependent colonial peoples. Like aforementioned in the introduction, the United States was also not in 
favour of the continued existence of colonial empires. However, much of the other Allied Powers 
were. The European imperial powers held the view that their colonies would help them to recover 
from the war. Therefore, the United States were reluctant to openly support the dissolution of the 
European overseas empires. Instead of official abolishing colonialism by means of the UN’s 
establishment, it was decided that the League’s mandates should be registered by the General 
Assembly and became trusteeships and the colonies became Non-Self-Governing Territories. In the 
Charter a voluntarily signed declaration was included in which the goals and purposes of these 
territories were defined. In this declaration it was agreed that the interests of the colonial people was 
paramount
44
    
  The alteration of colonies into Non-Self-Governing Territories and a special place for these 
territories in the Charter in combination with the inclusion of the principle of self-determination in 
Chapter I, Article 1.2 of the Charter
45
, self-determination gained a permanent role in international 
relations. Many members of the UN started to view the principle as one of the major principles of the 
world organization. However, when the Charter of the UN was established, it was decided that a 
compromise had to be made. The principle of sovereignty remained the basis of international relations. 
This was expressed in Article 2.1
46
 and 2.7
47
 of Chapter I of the Charter. These articles were 
concerned with the principle of sovereign equality of states and the principle of non-intervention into 
the domestic affairs of member states. However, Article 7 contains a reservation that referred to 
Chapter VII which contains the measures to take action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches 
of the peace, and acts of aggression. The sovereignty of states did not provide for immunity anymore. 
This development is also linked to the developments in the criteria for statehood and the stabilizing 
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factor of a claim for self-determination.  
  The two principals were included in the same Chapter of the Charter. Article 1 of the Charter, 
which contains the principle of self-determination, described the purposes of the UN. These purposes 
were a set of goals to achieve by the newly established world organization. These goals were: 1. to 
maintain international peace and security; 2. to develop friendly relations among nations; 3. to achieve 
international co-operation; and, 4. to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the 
attainment of these common ends. These goals were at that time not yet established.  Thus, the 
principle of self-determination, included in the second goal, was not an established right. In contrast to 
that, the principle of sovereignty was included in the second Article of the Chapter. This Article 
contained the principles of the UN. These two articles were the starting points in which manner the 
aforementioned objectives should be achieved. Like Blum mentioned in his article, the principle of 
self-determination was not an operative principle of the UN, in contrast to the principle of sovereignty.  
THE COLD WAR 
Like aforementioned, the right of self-determination was already issued by the leader of the Bolshevik 
revolution, Vladimir Lenin, before President Woodrow Wilson used the concept in his ideas about 
government by consent. During the final years of the First World War, both World Powers were 
already fighting for the public opinion of Europe. After the Second World War this rivalry would 
expand from Europe towards other parts of the world, especially the colonies that were administrated 
by European Powers and fighting for independence. A few years after the war, the rivalry between the 
United States and the Soviet Union led towards the beginning of the Cold War. The United States was 
not in favour of maintaining the imperial empires of the European Powers. However, it was dependent 
on the European Powers in their fight for influence. So, the United States had to be very careful in 
carrying out their policy. In order to strengthen their position, the State Department developed ideas 
that resulted in the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid.
48
 The difficulties of their position of 
strengthening the European countries, and either supporting the national ambitions of dependent 
peoples, will be showed in the second and third chapters of this thesis.  
Concluding the discourse of the principles of sovereignty and self-determination, it can be said that 
self-determination did not established itself as a positive right in international law. Like it is shown in 
the analysis of the Charter articles, self-determination was not supposed to be a positive right. 
However, many dependent peoples in the world viewed it as such. With the adoption of the General 
Assembly’s 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the 
UN acknowledged its role as the advocate for colonial independence. The Indonesian question, which 
was issued by the SC during the first years of the UN, is a case which shows the aforementioned 
developments that provided for the growing role of self-determination in international relations and 
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2. THE INDONESIAN DISPUTE: THE ACTORS 
AND THEIR INTERACTION 
 
As is mentioned in the previous chapter, the concepts of self-determination and sovereignty gained 
each a different place in the Charter of the UN. However, this place in the Charter was of major 
significance for the development of the two concepts. It is seen that self-determination became a 
positive right for colonial people, instead of a negative right –for European powers- in the pre-war 
period. The Indonesian Question was the first case of decolonisation that was issued by the SC and the 
admission of the Republic of Indonesia to membership of the UN was seen as a triumph for the SC.
49
 
From the moment the SC was established, decolonisation gained a significant place on the agenda of 
world politics and the UN and the SC were assigned an important role in the process.   
The history of the Netherlands and Indonesia goes back to the beginning of the Golden Age of the 
Netherlands. From 1816 the archipelago was referred to as the Netherlands-Indies. During the Second 
World War, the colony became occupied by the Japanese forces and the Western inhabitants of the 
archipelago were interned in camps. With the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese 
capitulated, but the Netherlands-Indies were still for a great part occupied by the remaining Japanese 
forces.
50
 The Allied Powers decided to send a mission, led by the British forces, to disarm the 
remaining Japanese forces and to free the prisoners of the Japanese internment camps. In the 
meanwhile, the nationalists in the Netherlands-Indies proclaimed the independent Republic of 
Indonesia under the leadership of President Sukarno. The first negotiations started with the British 
forces and the leaders of the Republic. Because of the presence of the British troops in the 
Netherlands-Indies and the alleged abuses of these troops, the attention of the SC was requested by the 
delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The British were accused of using the 
remaining Japanese forces against the nationalist movement of Indonesia.
51
 This first time the SC 
discussed the matter of Indonesia, it was decided to undertake no action.
52
 As soon as the Netherlands 
were prepared to restore the administration of the Netherlands-Indies, the government of the Republic 
of Indonesia challenged the Dutch claims on the territory and claimed their right to self-determination 
and independence. Negotiations between the Dutch authorities and the Republic resulted in the signing 
of the Linggadjati agreement and with that the recognition of the de facto authority of the Republic 
over the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura. The new state in the making would become a federation 
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and the Republic of Indonesia would be one of the states of the federated United States of Indonesia. 
Due to different interpretations of this agreement, difficulties rose between the two parties
53
 and the 
Dutch authorities launched the first military-action against the Republicans in Indonesia.
54
 The use of 
military action in Indonesia resulted in another debate in the SC about the Indonesian dispute. This 
time it was decided to take positive action and ask for the cessation of hostilities.
55
 Besides the cease-
fire resolution, it was also decided to establish a consular commission and a Committee of Good 
Offices (GOC). The consular commission was asked to provide information to the SC about the 
implementation of the cessation of hostilities and the GOC was asked to assist the quarrelling parties 
during the negotiations.
56
 These negotiations resulted in a truce agreement and the establishment for 
political principles, known as the Renville Agreement, which would provide a directive on the shape 
and form of the newly, soon to be established, independent state.
57
 Unfortunately, after these 
agreements, negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic reached a deadlock and a second 
military-action took place. After the second military-action, the SC started to use more authority to 
come to a solution of the Indonesian Question.
58
 In the end, a year after the second military-action and 
due to the successful preliminary conference and the Round Table Conference, the queen of the 
Netherlands transferred the sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.
59
 
This chapter will determine the main actors of the discussion in the SC, and will analyse the 
interaction between these actors. In order to do so, the actors will be given a role that is used by the 
concept of the Drama Triangle: a role of victim, persecutor or rescuer. The roles shall be used as a 
means to analyse the interaction between the actors and the ways of use of the concepts of self-
determination and sovereignty. Like it is written in the introduction, the different ways of use of the 
concepts of self-determination and sovereignty will be discussed in the third chapter of this thesis.   
THE UKRAINIAN COMPLAINT 
Like mentioned above, the Indonesian question was for the first time inserted in the agenda of the SC, 
because the Ukrainian SSR complained in a letter to the president of the SC about the situation in the 
Netherlands-Indies.
60
 In this letter the delegation expressed that “the Indonesians believed that the 
basic principles of the Charter of the UN, laying down the right of all peoples to self-determination, 
would be applied to them.”61 However, according to the Ukrainian delegation, the opposite was taking 
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place in Indonesia. The Ukrainian delegation accused the British forces of suppressing the national 
movement of Indonesia and using Japanese forces against this national movement.
62
 The Ukrainian 
representative stated that the actions of the British troops violated the Charter of the UN and asked to 
send a commission of enquiry to Indonesia, which would report to the SC about the situation in 
Indonesia.
63
 Besides the complaint in general, the letter was also send as indirect reaction to an earlier 
made complaint about the situation in Iran. The Ukrainian SSR was an independent state within the 
Soviet Republic. Despite its independent status, Ukrainian’s foreign policy was the same as the foreign 
policy of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Ukrainian SSR sent this letter in reaction to a situation in 
which the Soviet Union was involved. In general this meant that the Ukrainian SSR functioned in the 
SC as an extra vote for the Soviet Union.
64
 
  The majority of the members of the SC did not see the urgency of sending a commission to 
Indonesia without the approval of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.
65
 It seems that the British 
and Dutch representatives did explain their cause and the situation in Indonesia to satisfaction before 
the SC. During this first time the Indonesian Question was brought to the attention of the SC, the 
Council members seemed to be in agreement with each other. A resolution was not adopted
66
 and the 
letter from the Ukrainian delegation did not cause a lengthy discussion in the Council.
67
 However, the 
first outlines of the debates, that were held later on, appeared during the debate about the Ukrainian 
complaint. The first outline is the right of self-determination for the national movement in Indonesia 
that proclaimed independence in August 1945
68
, and the second outline is the sovereign jurisdiction of 
the Netherlands in Indonesia.
69
 These two subjects in the debate were concerned with the appearance 
of the British troops in Indonesia and the use of Japanese forces against the Indonesian Nationalists.  
  Although the discussion following the letter from the Ukrainian delegation did not show many 
disagreements between the members of the SC, the roles of the Drama Triangle could be already 
ascribed to certain actors in the discussion. With the condemnation of the British actions in Indonesia 
and the request to send a commission of enquiry, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR complied 
with the characteristics of the role as persecutor. Unsurprisingly, the representative of the Soviet 
Union supported the arguments of the Ukrainian representative
70
 and also adopted an attitude that 
complied with a role as persecutor. 
  The British representative reacted against the persecuting statements of the Soviet 
representatives in a very defensive way. The representative stated that he was offended by the 
                                                          
62
 Idem, 175-176 
63
 UNSCOR, 12
th
 mtg., 177 
64
 Iran had complained that the presence of Soviet forces interfered Iran’s international affairs. 
65
 UNSCOR, 16
th
 meeting (11 February 1946) 236 
66
 UNSCOR, 18
th
 mtg., 258 
67
 The debate was held in only 7 meetings in comparison with the debates following the first and second police 
actions. 
68
 UNSCOR, 13
th
 meeting (9 February 1946) 190-193 
69
 Idem, 193-196 
70
 UNSCOR, 14
th
 meeting (10 February 1946) 199-209 
24 
 
allegations that were made by the Ukrainian representative. In his reaction he tried to invalidate the 
statements of the Ukrainian representative.
71
Besides the allegations, the British representative had also 
another reason to defend the British position in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. The United Kingdom 
held the view that Southeast Asia was vulnerable for the communist influence from the Soviet Union. 
Support from the SC for a case about self-determination and independency that was called upon by a 
Soviet State was not preferred by the British foreign office.
72
 With his defensive response, the British 
representative complied with the characteristics of the role as victim in the conflict situation. 
  The third main actor in the discussion, the representative of the Netherlands, supported the 
defensive arguments of the British representative and explained the part of the problem that did not lie 
within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom and neither the jurisdiction of the SC, the independence 
of Indonesia.
73
 With the explanation of the Dutch representative and the assurance that negotiations 
with the Indonesian nationalists were about to take place, the Netherlands representative complied 
with most of the characteristics of the role as rescuer in the discussion. Because of the supportive 
arguments and assurance of the Netherlands, the SC decided that there was no urgency to send a 
commission of enquiry to Indonesia. However, it is questionable if the SC would have abandoned the 
idea of sending a commission without the insurance of the Netherlands representative that the 
Netherlands Government was intended to negotiate with the Indonesian Republic. Therefore, the 
adopted role as rescuer in this debate was crucial in order to direct the debates towards a preferred 
outcome –non-intervention.  
  The British and Netherlands representatives, in contrast with the Ukrainian representative, 
divided the situation that was brought to the attention of the SC in two separate parts. The first part 
was the Allied mission in East-Asia that had the duty to disarm the remaining Japanese forces and to 
free the many Western internees who were imprisoned by the Japanese. In general, the British forces 
had nothing to do with the Indonesia nationalists. The claim that Indonesia was to become an 
independent nation was a problem that lay within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands.
74
 The Ukrainian 
representative and with him the representative of the Soviet Union did not see this difference and 
linked the military presence of the United Kingdom in Indonesia with the repression of the Indonesian 
nationalists. In this way, the Ukrainian representative was able to make allegations towards the 
British.
75
 However, the notion that the presence of the British army in Indonesia was part of an Allied 
mission and the Ukrainian delegation did not ask for the withdrawal of the British troops, the majority 
of the members of the SC saw no reason to undertake any action.
76
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THE FIRST MILITARY ACTION 
One and a half years later, the soothing words of the Dutch representative proved to be in 
disagreement with the actions by his Government back home. Like he had mentioned during the 
debate concerning the Ukrainian complaint, the Dutch authorities had started negotiations and 
following these negotiations an agreement was reached at Linggadjati. The Republic of Indonesia 
became recognized as the de facto authority in Java, Sumatra and Madura, but it would become part of 
a sovereign and federal United States of Indonesia. During the interim-period Dutch sovereignty 
would stay intact. The new state would form a Union with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, headed by 
the Queen.  
  However, this Linggadjati Agreement did not meet the expectations of the Dutch parliament 
and the ratification of the agreement was followed by an explanation that, in short, limited the de facto 
recognition of the Republic and made the, to be established, Union between the United States of 
Indonesia and the Netherlands, a Union that could be better described as a new version of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. The real sovereign independence of the Indonesian people, as 
represented by the Indonesian Republic, was not conceivable by the Netherlands Government.
77
  
  The leaders of the Indonesian Republic that signed the original Linggadjati Agreement were 
not eager to ratify Linggadjati as interpreted by the Netherlands Government. The Netherlands 
Government reacted to this refusal with the execution of its first military action against the Indonesian 
Republic. This action was held in the first place to eliminate the radical parts of the Republic –who did 
not want to sign the new Linggadjati- and restore order in the areas that were held by the Republican 
forces. The Dutch Government had hoped that, by eliminating the radical parts, the more neutral parts 
of the Republic would be open to negotiate and sign the altered Linggadjati Agreement. However, 
they miscalculated the amount of support the Republicans had in the Netherlands Indies and the 
strength of the Republican army. They also miscalculated the response of the international community 
at their actions and were not prepared for an elaborate intervention by the UN, requested by the 
Republican Government.
78
  
The military action was brought to the attention of the SC by the delegations of Australia and India, 
two members of the British Commonwealth. Both were young, almost independent, states that longed 
for an important place in international relations in their own region, Southeast Asia and Oceania. Both 
states were firmly against colonialism. They accused the Dutch Government of causing a threat to 
international peace and security and waging a colonial war against the Indonesian people who were 
executing their right of self-determination. According to the delegations of Australia and India, the 
Netherlands had violated the Charter of the UN and with the launch of the military actions, had caused 
a threat to international peace and security. Besides the threat to international peace and security, both 
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Australia and India were also dependent on the situation in Indonesia regarding the stability in the 
area. The instable situation in Indonesia would have had an influence on the regional stability of, for 
example, trade. The representatives of Australia and India held the view that the Dutch Government 
was to blame for the difficult situation in Indonesia.
79
 The arguments which were put forward by the 
Dutch representative in defence of the actions of his government were poorly received by the 
representatives of Australia and India. The proactivity and judgment shown by these two countries in 
convicting the actions of the Dutch Government showed characteristics that belong to the role of 
persecutor, like the role that was ascribed to the two Soviet representatives during the debate about the 
Ukrainian complaint.   
  As soon as the Dutch representative was able to give an explanatory speech in defence of his 
Government before the Council, the representative stated that the SC was not entitled to intervene in 
the Indonesian question, because the dispute was within the domestic jurisdiction of the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands. The representative acted as if the Kingdom of the Netherlands was the victim of 
unlawful intervention by the UN. He presented the military actions as police measures against the 
numerous bands that terrorized the Indonesian inhabitants. With the elimination of these bands, the 
execution of the right of self-determination of the Indonesian people who did not sympathize with the 
Republic would be safeguarded. The Republicans did not represent the whole Indonesian population, 
according to the Dutch representative.
80
  
  Analysing the arguments of the Netherlands representative in its explanatory speech, 
characteristics of several roles of the Drama Triangle are found. It seems that in regards to different 
elements of the debate, different roles can be ascribed to the representative. To the attitude of the 
representative towards the argument about the competence of the SC could a role as victim be 
ascribed. The representative postulated his arguments in a way that it seems that the SC was violating 
the Charter by intervening in the dispute instead of the Dutch Government. Another role can be 
ascribed to the argument the representative putted forward in regards to the self-determination of 
Indonesia. The representative explains that the military action was waged against terrorists and bands 
in order to safeguard the self-determination of the whole population of Indonesia. It seems that the 
representative held the view that the ‘normal’ Indonesians must be saved from the terrorizing 
Republic. Considering this argumentation, also a role as rescuer could be ascribed to the Dutch 
representative. Regarding the different elements in the debate, the representative used a role as victim 
or a role as rescuer. This switching of roles could be ascribed to the image the representative wanted to 
portray to the SC of the Dutch Government and its sovereign responsibilities in Indonesia. The role as 
victim was aimed at non-intervention in the Indonesian dispute by the SC and the role as rescuer was 
aimed at soothing the SC members and convincing the Council of the good intentions of the 
Netherlands Government. Although, only the Western powers in the SC were partially convinced of 
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the incompetence of the SC and the good intentions of the Netherlands Government.
81
 This position of 
the Western powers is to explain from an imperial point of view. The European powers that still 
administrated colonies did not prefer a UN that intervened in their imperial policies.  
  A more plausible role as rescuer could be ascribed to the representative of the United States of 
America. In his speeches the representative did not take sides for either party. He stated that the Dutch 
representative had every right in challenging the jurisdiction of the SC. However, he was also 
convinced that the Council had the right to ask the conflicting parties to cease hostilities.
 
The 
representative divided the problem in two parts. A part that belonged to the domestic jurisdiction of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and a part that belonged within the competence of the SC, the 
hostilities that were taking place in Indonesia.
82 
The United States supported the resolution that asked 
for the cessation of these hostilities without mentioning the threat to international peace and security, 
which was issued by the Australian and Indian representatives.
 
He was convinced that the UN and the 
international community must view the dispute in an equal manner, and stated that the Council must 
be acting impartial in its decisions and actions.
83
 Besides this preference for equality, the United States 
were, at first, reluctant to intervene in the conflict. After their intervention had failed in China, they 
were not eager to cause another failure in Southeast Asia.
84
 Another reason for the moderate stand of 
the United States’ representative was the value that was given by the State Department to friendly 
relations with European powers.
85
 
  The statement about impartiality was especially projected upon the permanent Council 
member which was ascribed the role of persecutor in regards to the debate about the Ukrainian 
complaint. During the debate about the launch of the first military action, the Soviet Union appointed 
the Dutch Government as the aggressor that invaded the territory of another state, the Indonesian 
Republic.
86
 The Soviet representative stated that the SC was obliged to support the Indonesian 
Republic and demanded the withdrawal of the Dutch troops.
87
 With help of an argumentation in 
accordance with the role as persecutor, the Soviet Union was proclaiming its role as fore-fighter for 
the right of self-determination of the dependent and suppressed people of, particularly, the Western 
colonies. 
Regarding the debate in the SC about the first military action of the Dutch Government in Indonesia 
from the receipt of the letters of Australia and India to the adoption of the resolution that called for the 
cessation of hostilities in Indonesia, several main actors are determined. At first the representatives of 
Australia and India brought the matter to the attention of the SC and were ascribed a role as persecutor 
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in the conflict regarding the Drama Triangle. The Dutch representative reacted to the attitude of 
Australia and India in a defensive and explanatory way. Like it is mentioned, regarding the different 
elements of the debate, the representative switched between the roles of victim and rescuer. The 
United States, dragged into the debate by its offer of Good Offices to the Dutch and Indonesian 
Governments, was ascribed a role as rescuer. Because of its policy of impartiality, the representative 
was able to let the SC come to a compromise regarding the cease-fire resolution. The representative of 
the Soviet Union reacted offended by the impartial policy of the United States and asked for a clear 
condemnation of the actions of the Dutch Government in Indonesia. In regards to this attitude, the 
Soviet Union was ascribed the role as persecutor again. 
  With the different roles that were visible during the debate in the SC, the different actors were 
trying to convince the SC of their right, and with that trying to gain influence regarding the settlement 
of the dispute. The attitude of the different representatives regarding the conflict caused also the 
attitude of other representatives which could be ascribed to the different roles. The persecuting attitude 
of Australia and India caused the defensive attitude of the representative of the Netherlands and the 
policy of impartiality that was preferred by the representative of the United States caused the adoption 
of a persecuting attitude by the representative of the Soviet Union.      
THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES 
When the SC adopted the resolution that called upon both the Dutch Government and the Republican 
Government to cease hostilities, the debate in the SC did not end. The first step of intervention by the 
UN was set and it was time to discuss the second part of the problem, the settlement of the dispute. In 
order to receive information concerning the dispute from not only the Netherlands but also the newly 
established Republic of Indonesia, the Council invited a representative of the Indonesian Republic to 
the discussions at the Council table, by special request of the representative of the Soviet Union.
88
 This 
invitation was not sent to the Republic without a debate beforehand. The representative of the 
Netherlands held the view that only sovereign, independent states were allowed to participate in the 
discussions in the SC and opposed the request of the Soviet representative.
89
 More and more, it 
becomes clear that the Dutch representative and with him the Dutch Government were holding on to a 
system of international relations that was based on international law instead of politics. The United 
States, with its moderate approach, seems to have made the shift to international politics much sooner.  
Like before, during the debate about the determination of a threat to international peace and security, 
the United States’ representative found a way that compromises between the different viewpoints of 
the representatives. He proposed to follow the UN’s Charter not by letter but by spirit. The Republic 
of Indonesia was a party in a dispute the Council discussed. So, it was only fair to invite the Republic 
to present the other side of the conflict. This would, however, not mean that the SC recognized the 
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Republic as a state.
90
 
  Like aforementioned, the Dutch representative was opposed to active mediation by the SC, but 
he made a suggestion to the United States to act as mediator and provide for Good Offices.
91
 The 
United States accepted this proposal
92
 but several Council members, primarily the Soviet Union, 
accused the Netherlands of trying to by-pass the SC. In his opinion, the Republic of Indonesia was 
dependent on the SC for finding a just solution that would bring the Republic towards self-
government. It would be unfair if the SC would abdicate the question to the Netherlands and some 
mediators without involvement by the SC.
93
 Regarding the evolving Cold War during the Indonesian 
conflict, by-passing the Council by an act of mediation does not seemed to be of main concern by the 
Soviet Union. However, the real problem in this case lies within the idea that the United States would 
act as mediator and with that function would have a great influence on the process towards 
independence of Indonesia.  
  As soon as the Republic had been invited by the Council to participate in the discussions, the 
representative of the Republic made clear that it preferred an intervention by means of a UN 
commission rather than an offer of good offices from the United States of America.
94
  The Indonesian 
Republic suggested establishing a commission with powers of arbitration. The establishment of a 
commission of arbitration was a rather rigid measure in comparison with an offer of good offices. 
Giving good offices to two parties in a conflict is merely just giving advice how to proceed when the 
two parties would ask for it. Arbitration is something different. Both parties would lay the settlement 
of their conflict in the hands of a third party. The decision of the third party about the settlement of the 
conflict would be binding.  
  Following the statements of the Dutch representative, the establishment of a commission with 
arbitration powers was not acceptable for the Netherlands. Once again, the Netherlands were granted a 
lighter version of the initial plans for intervening in the Indonesian dispute. It was decided that a 
Committee of Good Offices would be established, consisting of three members of the SC. The 
Netherlands and the Republic each had to choose one and the two chosen members had to choose the 
third one.
95
 The Dutch Government asked Belgium to represent their cause and the Republic asked 
Australia. Australia and Belgium choose, in turn, the United States of America to complete the 
Committee.
96
  
  The establishment of the GOC following the cease-fire resolution without the notion of a 
threat to international peace and security shows that the Dutch representative in the SC received 
enough support to let their arguments of competence count. The debates in the SC made visible that 
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the supporters of the Netherlands had still a lot of influence in the decision-making-process in the SC 
–France and the United Kingdom, both colonial powers, had veto power in the SC Later on, it will be 
shown that when this support shrinks, the decision-making-process in the SC would change.  
The discussions in the SC about the invitation of the Republic and thereupon the discussions about the 
establishment of a special commission showed no major moderation in the attitude of the main actors 
towards the dispute in Indonesia. However, one thing did change. The Republic of Indonesia was not 
only the subject of the debates anymore. It had become also one of the actors of the debates in the SC. 
Immediately from the moment the Republican representative held his first speech before the Council, 
he portrayed the Indonesian people as victims of the colonial exploitation of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. The Indonesians were longing for independence and with the launch of the military 
action and the following violations of the cease fire order, the Netherlands were still trying to restore 
colonial rule. The Government of the Republic formally requested the SC to intervene in the dispute 
and to establish a commission that would help find a solution for the problem in Indonesia.
97
 The 
Republic chose deliberately to use the UN and its role of growing importance in public opinion as the 
means to acquire independence. It followed a policy that was preceded by India as part of the British 
Commonwealth but with ambition to become the leader of Asia.
98
   
  From the moment the representative of the Indonesian Republic joined the debate in the 
Council a competition started between the representatives of the Netherlands and the Republic for the 
sympathy of the SC and a debate about which party was right. To and fro, accusations were expressed 
and sacrifices were summed up. With the tone the Republican representative had set for his speeches, 
he tried to win over the Council’s sympathy. Also the decision to refuse the United States’ offer of 
good offices was taken because the Republic was eager to involve the international community and in 
particular the UN with the Indonesian dispute. Another argument to refuse the United States’ offer was 
the support it had given to the Netherlands during the debates in the SC. The United States 
representative prevented the adoption of a resolution that acknowledged the existence of a breach in 
international peace and security; he decided to invite the Republic of Indonesia at the Council table as 
a party in the dispute rather than an independent state; and he managed to let the SC establish a GOC 
rather than an arbitration commission. Because of this support, the representative of the Republic 
decided to win over the sympathy of the SC, chose to ask Australia as their representative at the GOC, 
and tried to find a settlement by means of intervention by the UN. Later on, the presence of a 
representative from the Republic in the SC would prove to be of major importance. 
  The representative of the Soviet Union, who had requested the SC to invite a representative of 
the Republic, was in disagreement with the measures the SC was taking to provide a quick settlement 
of the dispute. He was not in favour of the impartial way of approaching the matter and kept 
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demanding a formal condemnation of the actions of the Dutch Government in Indonesia. He stated 
that if the SC would proceed in this way, the right of self-determination for the Indonesians would not 
be executed in a fair manner.
99
 Therefore, the GOC must be altered into a commission that contained 
members from the SC and had powers that were similar to a commission of arbitration.
100
 Even when 
the representative of the Republic seems to be in agreement with the actions of the SC, the Soviet 
Union did not. The representative kept persecuting the Netherlands Government and when the SC 
made progress regarding the dispute, the representative started to also persecute the SC and, later on, 
also the United States.  
Regarding the establishment of the GOC it is seen that a change in the dynamics between the major 
actors occurred because of the invitation and presence of a representative from the Republic at the 
council-table of the SC. The Dutch and Republican representatives had started a competition for the 
sympathy of the international community and their right. The United States’ representative’s attitude 
towards the means to find a settlement of the dispute that could be described as a role as rescuer, was 
not accepted by the representative of the Republic of Indonesia. Australia and India received from the 
presence of the representative of the Republic input that strengthened their argumentation. However, 
the Soviet Union did not show any alterations regarding the presence of a representative from the 
Republic. It held on to the same arguments and the same reluctance to make compromises it had done 
before.  
  The representatives of Australia and India agreed with the Soviet Union that the GOC must 
have more powers regarding the negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic. However, 
different than the policy of the Soviet Union, they were willing to make compromises in order to be 
able to adopt a cease-fire resolution and to establish a commission that would contribute to a 
settlement of the dispute. The next paragraph will show that these compromises did not mean that 
Australian and India were satisfied with the manner of intervention by the SC.    
 THE RENVILLE AGREEMENT 
In the same period as the establishment of the GOC, a consular commission to supervise the cease-fire 
resolution was also established by the SC.
101
 The first report of this consular commission to the SC 
showed that both parties experienced difficulties with implementing the cease-fire order. The SC 
decided to give the GOC instructions to help both parties to better implement the order.
102
 The first 
negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic were aimed at an agreement about an armistice 
and principles on which further agreement would be built. During the negotiations, the GOC submitted 
eight suggestions for this implementation but the parties could not agree with all of the suggestions. In 
order to overcome the disagreement, the GOC launched its ‘Christmas Message’, named after the date 
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it was send: Christmas day. The Republican delegation accepted this ‘Message’ as a whole, but the 
Dutch delegation did not. The Netherlands submitted a counter proposal and stated that these 12 
principles were final and not open for discussion. The GOC, in reaction to the Netherlands, responded 
with seven additional principles. The Dutch Government was put under pressure from the United 
States to accept these additional principles. At the Dutch Embassy in Washington it was announced 
that the acceptance of the additional principles would have a decisive influence on the granting of 
Marshall Aid to the Netherlands. The Dutch Government agreed upon the principles, which were 
reduced to six principles, with reluctance. The GOC, on their turn, consulted the Republic and pressed 
the Republic to accept the 12 principles that were submitted by the Netherlands and the six additional 
principles of the GOC. In the end, the GOC granted the Republic some informal promises about the 
status of the Republic that were not in agreement with the wishes of the Dutch Government.
 103
 Like 
Linggadjati, this Renville agreement, called after the location of the negotiations -a United States’ 
battleship-, also became a dual agreement.
104
 
  According to Renville it was agreed to put a halt to the federal practices of the Netherlands-
Indies Government in the areas that were former Republican territories.
105
 At the islands of Java and 
Madura several federal governments were established in order to counter balance the Republic. Van 
Mook, Governor-General of the Netherlands-Indies, was of opinion that there was no other option to 
administrate the archipelago of Indonesia than by means of a federal system. Instead of the 
establishment of federal states the inhabitants of Indonesia should decide upon their relation towards 
the Republic by means of a plebiscite. In return, the Republic recognized the sovereignty of the 
Netherlands over Indonesia until it would transfer its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia.
106
  
The report of the GOC that described the signing of the Renville agreement was received by the SC 
with mixed feelings. The Soviet representative, still retaining the attitude of a persecutor, argued 
strongly against the agreement. He did not trust the GOC and held the view that the SC, with help of 
the United States, was aiding the colonial aims and warfare of the Netherlands. In his eyes, the 
Renville agreement was a step back on the road towards independence for Indonesia.
107
    
  The representative of the Republic used the discussion about the report to stress the amount of 
concessions the Republic had to make in order to come to an agreement. He also asked for 
strengthening the GOC with granting it the power to make concessions without waiting to be asked in 
front.
108
 This viewpoint was supported by the Australian representative at the GOC and the Australian 
representative at the SC. They held the view that, in order to let the Renville agreement succeed, the 
GOC had to gain more powers; otherwise it was possible that an impasse just like after Linggadjati 
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would occur.
109
  
  The Dutch representative, backed by the Belgian representative at the GOC, stated that the SC 
did not have the competence to grant the GOC more powers. He stressed the problem with the 
domestic jurisdiction and the competence of the SC again.
110
  
  Despite the success of the GOC in letting both parties come to an agreement, some actors in 
the SC debates were not satisfied with the results. Especially Australia and India stressed the fact that 
Renville was an agreement about an armistice and principles on which further elaboration should be 
ground. Both parties were one step closer to a solution for a final settlement. However, like 
aforementioned, the Australian member of the GOC stated that the negotiations towards the signing of 
Renville were very exhausting and difficult. In order to simplify these talks, the GOC should be 
granted more powers. The Soviet Union was of the opinion that the GOC should be disbanded 
immediately and a new commission should be established. Renville was a victory for the Netherlands 
and their colonial rule and not a success to be proud of. The least satisfied was the Republic itself. The 
debate in the SC did not talk about the difficulties that were experienced with ratifying the agreement. 
However, the speeches of the Republican representative showed that he was not really satisfied with 
the outcome of the negotiations. The Republic was forced to make a lot of concessions and the 
representative exaggerated these concessions in his speeches before the SC. He did this also, like his 
other speeches, to present the goodwill of his government before the SC and to win over the sympathy 
of the Council-members.    
One of the agreements that were made in the Renville agreement was that the Dutch authorities would 
stop supporting the establishment of new federal states. However, after the singing of the agreement, 
several Dutch officials in Indonesia kept supporting these states. These alleged violations of Renville 
by the Dutch authorities gave an opportunity to the representative of the Republic to change from his 
underdog position and ascribed role as victim to a more persecuting role in the debates by accusing the 
Dutch Government in Indonesia of proceeding with the establishment and strengthening of federal 
states in order to diminish the influence of the Republic. He held the view that the Netherlands were 
not establishing federal states in the spirit of the right of self-determination. He stated that the 
Netherlands were trying to by-pass the Republic in order to gain more influence in Indonesia after it 
would receive independence. Besides this, the Dutch Government were violating the newly signed 
Renville agreement.
111
 
  During these debates about the Renville agreement and the implementation of this agreement 
it is visible that the representative of the Republic gained more influence regarding the debates in the 
SC. With the signing of the agreement under supervision of the GOC, the Republic found a place 
where it could complain about violations of this agreement, in contrary to the earlier signed 
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Linggadjati agreement. The Dutch authorities in Indonesia could not do whatever they pleased 
anymore without a reaction from the international community. At first, the SC reacted only on the 
presence of armed combat in Indonesia, but after the signing of Renville, other actions that 
undermined an agreement that was signed under supervision of a SC commission were also no longer 
tolerated. This weakened the position of the Dutch Government and made the policy of the Dutch 
representative -ascribed a role as victim, respectively rescuer- towards the debates in the SC gradually 
more unreliable. This weakened position will become clearer after the launch of the second military 
action.  
THE SECOND MILITARY ACTION 
The Renville agreement became, like Linggadjati, a dual agreement. The duality of the agreement lay 
within the status of the Republic. Formally, it was agreed that the Republic would become a part of a 
sovereign and federal United States of Indonesia. The Republic would become just a minor part of this 
state. However, a member of the GOC had promised that the Renville agreement would not alter the 
status of both of the parties, which meant that the Republic had the status it had proclaimed about 
itself during the declaration of independence in 1945.
112
 The status of the Republic, alongside some 
other issues, caused a standstill in the negotiations that took place after the signing of the Renville 
agreement. Suggestions that were presented by the GOC were not accepted by the Dutch Government 
and the United States became reluctant in the support it would give to the Netherlands. In the 
meanwhile, the Republican Government successfully struck down a communist revolt, better known 
as the Madiun revolt. The Dutch Government had seen the rise of the communists as proof that the 
Republicans were not able to provide for stability. It was one of the situations that could provide for a 
plausible argument to start a military action. However, the Republic was successful with repressing the 
revolt and the United States came to the conclusion that it would no longer put into question the future 
of the Republic. From that moment, the United States held the view that the Republic was capable of 
providing for law and order in Indonesia and that it should have a future as a state.
113
 During this 
particular period it is seen that the stability of the claim for self-determination was of importance for 
the United States. Besides the stability-factor, the nature of the claim of self-determination by the 
Republic –anti-communist- was preferred by the United States. 
  Only a few in the Dutch Government, for example the minister of foreign affairs, took the 
warning of the United States to let go of the idea to start a second military action seriously. The Dutch 
Government offered the Republican Government an agreement that literally asked for the ending of 
the Republic as a state. The Republic did not give in to this suggestion and the Dutch Government 
believed they had no other option to start the military action.
114
 However, the Dutch authorities 
decided to wait for the SC to hold its recess during the Christmas holidays. By January the Republic 
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would be demolished and an interim government could be established with support of the federalists. 
The United States representative at the GOC urged Hatta, the prime-minister of the Republic, to send a 
letter to the Dutch Government in order to resume negotiations. However, the Dutch Government just 
repeated their earlier presented conditions and called an ultimatum. It was impossible for the Republic 
to react on the ultimatum on time and the Dutch Government ordered to proceed with the military 
action on 18 December 1949. During this action, Yogyakarta, headquarters of the Republic, became 
occupied and the leaders of the Republic were captivated. Despite the first successes the Dutch troops 
had, everything turned out different than the Dutch Government had expected.
 115
  
Despite the planned execution of the military action during the holiday of the SC, the Council did not 
wait until the holiday was over and immediately arranged an emergency meeting.
116
 The Dutch 
representative was summoned to explain the military actions of his Government before the SC. He 
stated on behalf of his Government that the military action was held in order to repress certain 
“irresponsible and extremist elements”. These elements had to be eliminated in order to provide for 
law and order in the areas concerned. From the Dutch point of view, the Government of the Republic 
belonged to the elements which should be repressed in order to provide for law and order. Therefore, 
the Dutch troops arrested the Republican leaders and imprisoned them on an island. The SC requested 
the Dutch authorities to free these leaders, but the Netherlands were of opinion that these leaders 
endangered the stability in Indonesia. Law and order were essential in the process of the organisation 
of plebiscites and the expression of freedom of speech by the Indonesian people. The representative of 
the Netherlands held the view that the Dutch forces were freeing the Indonesian people of repression, 
laid upon them by the Republicans. The Netherlands claimed before the SC to ‘rescue’ the right of 
self-determination of the people of Indonesia.
117
 
  The representative of the Republic, who was totally isolated from his Government, acted in 
compliance with the role as victim again and stated before the SC that the Dutch representative 
portrayed the ‘irresponsible and extremist elements’ in a wrong way. The real reason of the chaotic 
situation and lack of law and order in Indonesia was, according to the Indonesian representative, the 
growing resistance and hatred towards the foreign occupation of the Netherlands by the inhabitants of, 
in particular, Java and Sumatra. From his point of view, the Netherlands were supressing again the 
expression of self-determination by the Republicans and their followers.
118
 It seems that, for the 
second time, both parties were accusing the other party of suppressing the right of self-determination. 
The Dutch representative used a line of arguments that was compatible with the role of rescuer again 
in order to let the SC believe their good intentions and, therefore, to let the SC step back from the case. 
The representative of the Republic, in compliance with the role as victim, let the Council believe the 
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opposite and convinced the Council that the Republic needed its help.  
  The representative of the United States, acted like the role as rescuer, had adopted, in the first 
place, a more impartial approach towards the arguments of the representative of the Netherlands. 
However, after the launch of the second military action, the impartial tone of the speeches of the 
representative changed into a more reluctant standpoint towards the arguments of the Netherlands.
119
 
After the successful suppression of the communist revolt in Indonesia by the Republic Government, 
the United States State Department was convinced of the capabilities of the Republican administration 
by Hatta and his parliament.
120
 Because of the second military action, the United States representative 
turned openly from an attitude compatible to a role as rescuer to an attitude that was compatible with a 
role as persecutor. For the first time, the United States representative made it clear that the State 
Department held the view that the situation in Indonesia was causing a breach in international peace 
and security. The competence of the SC was no longer disputable. The Dutch Government had to fulfil 
the orders that were given by means of the adoption of several resolutions by the SC.
121
 
  The Soviet Union, still acting like a persecutor, adopted a gradually emerging aggressive tone 
towards, in particular, the Netherlands and the United States. During the aftermath of the ‘Renville’ 
agreement, the Soviet representative expanded its persecutions already from the Netherlands, to the 
United States, and to the SC. This time, the representative accused the United States of suppressing the 
right of self-determination by supporting the crushing of the communist uprising. He did not say a 
word about the involvement of the Republican Government.
122
 From this moment on, the Soviet Union 
became unclear in its arguments. Generally speaking, its representative was opposed to almost all 
resolutions and actions that were undertaken by the SC. Later on, this attitude would strike a hold to 
some important plans of the SC. The representatives of the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian SSR 
abstained and sometimes vetoed resolutions and paragraphs of resolutions that expressed in part 
certain actions that were supported by these representatives. However, because of the impartiality that 
was used in these resolutions, the representatives abstained or vetoed them.
123
 It became apparent that 
the Soviet Union only agreed with its own strategy towards the Indonesian question and did not accept 
compromise.  
  In reaction to the accusations, presented by the actors that acted in compliance with the role as 
persecutor, the Dutch representative, with help of the Belgian and France representatives, changed its 
attitude that complied with a role as rescuer into an attitude that complied with a role as victim again. 
The representative stated that the Netherlands was not neglecting the Charter, but the SC was. He held 
the view that the SC was “undermining the whole structure of the UN by breaking away one of its 
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main pillars, which is that the UN shall refrain from interference in the internal affairs of member 
states.”124    
The change in attitude of the United States representative enabled the SC to take stronger decisions. It 
was decided to step back from merely giving Good Offices to both parties and alter the GOC into a 
United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) which held more powers than the GOC. This 
commission would advise and urge the two parties to come to an agreement. With the establishment of 
the UNCI, an action plan describing the release of the Republican leaders, the restoration of the 
Republic, the interim period and the transfer of sovereignty was also adopted.
125
 From this moment on, 
the SC was no longer only acquainted with the cessation of hostilities and providing good offices, the 
SC decided to play a more active role in the settlement of the dispute and the safeguarding of the right 
of self-determination executed by the Indonesian people.  
  The debates in the SC following the second military action showed also another important 
difference between the debates following the first military action. With the imprisonment of the 
Republican leader, the Dutch authorities had hoped to eliminate the Republic as an actor in the 
negotiations towards an interim government and the final establishment of the United States of 
Indonesia. However, the Republic survived this elimination, for a major part, thanks to the presence of 
a representative at the table of the SC. Therefore, it was not possible to eliminate the Republic as an 
actor in the dispute and hold back intervention from the SC.       
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDONESIA AND THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE 
The world-wide condemnation of the military actions caused a sense of realism within the Dutch 
delegation in Indonesia and the Government at home. As soon as the resolution that called for the 
establishment of the UNCI and provided for a plan of action for the final settlement of the dispute, the 
Dutch Government, like mentioned above, made a 360 degrees turn concerning their policy in 
Indonesia. The members of the SC, in particular, the United States representative, did not trust in the 
first place the intentions of the Dutch Government. The United States representative was not in favour 
of the change of policy and demanded that the obligations that were laid upon the Netherlands with the 
resolution of 28 January had to be fulfilled.
126
 Other members, for instance India, held the view that 
the Netherlands were not only neglecting the resolutions of the SC but also were trying to by-pass the 
SC with its new policy.
127
  
   However, the representative of Australia, who had acted like a persecutor throughout the 
whole dispute, stated that the organisation of a round table conference in itself was a plan that was 
acceptable by anyone in the SC. The intentions of the Dutch Government and the terms and conditions 
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of the conference were disputable, but the procedure in itself was acceptable.
128
  
  In this spirit, a new important actor presented itself in the debate. The representative of Canada 
provided for the Dutch Government a way in which their new policy could work. Canada was, like 
Australia and India, a member of the British Commonwealth who aspired an important role in 
international relations. Different from the regional focus of Australia and India, Canada fulfilled a 
mediator role between the members of the Atlantic Alliance and in particular the Western powers.
129
 
With the absence of the United States as a constructive force in the mediation process between the 
Republic and the Netherlands, Canada managed to fill this gab. The representative suggested the 
organisation by the UNCI of a preliminary conference that would discuss the ordered restoration of the 
Republic.
130
 With this statement he took the role of rescuer over from the representative of the United 
States, who was at first very reluctant towards the new suggestion. The United States was of opinion 
that the organisation of a preliminary conference was not in concord with the resolution. Adopting the 
Canadian proposal would mean, in their eyes, the neglect of the previous SC resolution.
131
 Therefore, 
it was proposed to match the preliminary conference to the restoration of the Republic. The message 
that would be sent to the UNCI would contain a reference to the earlier adopted resolution. After it 
was clearly determined that the preliminary conference would not by-pass earlier decisions of the SC, 
it was decided to send the message to the UNCI.
132
 By this manner, the Canadian representative took 
the role as rescuer over from the representative of the United States and provided for a step in the good 
direction towards a final settlement in a period of time the United States was not capable to do so. 
  The agreement to organize a preliminary conference gave the SC an opportunity to bring the 
Indonesian dispute to an end. The reluctance that was showed by the United States representative 
towards the policy of the Netherlands was not constructive regarding the search for a solution of the 
dispute. Neither was the attitude of the Netherlands towards the competence of the SC. Otherwise, the 
Canadian representative did follow a constructive method by taking over the Dutch idea to held a 
preliminary conference and let this conference fit in with the decisions that were already made. It 
opened a path towards the final agreement about the transfer of sovereignty. 
THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THE UNIFICATION OF INDONESIA 
The preliminary conference became a success the moment the United States decided to support and 
put under pressure both parties again instead of only supporting the Republic and only pressing the 
Netherlands. An agreement about the terms and conditions of the restoration of the Republic and the 
agenda of the soon to be held round table conference was reached.
133
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  Following the preliminary conference, the Round Table Conference was held in The Hague. 
During this conference the constitution of the United States of Indonesia was written and the terms and 
conditions of the union with the Netherlands were decided. According to the SC debate regarding the 
Round Table Agreement, it seems like the negotiations during the RTC went well. All members of the 
SC and other participants were in a celebrating spirit and both parties were praised for their co-
operation.
134
 This assumption is false. Negotiations went really difficult and the delegations needed to 
step up in order to please their Governments. The Dutch delegation had to use the subject of New 
Guinea to get the RTC agreement ratified by the Dutch parliament. The Indonesian delegation held the 
view that New Guinea did belong to the Indonesian archipelago, but the Netherlands were of opinion 
that New Guinea was not yet ready to gain independence. The UNCI solved this problem to promise to 
the Republic delegation that negotiations would proceed after the transfer of sovereignty and that New 
Guinea would join the United States of Indonesia in a year.
135
  
  The issue of New Guinea was a way of the Dutch parliament to express its doubts about the 
fastened transfer of sovereignty. Some members were still of opinion that the policy of the 
Government seemed like an abandonment, a policy that was openly condemned by the parliament and 
also the Dutch public opinion.
136
 Some members of the parliament held the view that the RTC 
agreement that was reached during the Conference did not contribute to the execution of the right of 
self-determination for all Indonesians. They expressed their concerns about the removal of an interim 
period and demanded an extra explanation concerning the right of self-determination alongside the 
ratification by the parliament of the RTC agreement.
137
  
  The Republican delegation had also concerns. They were really focussed on the transfer of real 
unconditional sovereignty. The clause the Dutch parliament adopted alongside the ratification of the 
RTC agreement was viewed with doubt. Also the Union with the Netherlands, headed by the Queen, 
was one of the major issues. The Dutch Government was favouring a strong ‘heavy’ Union and the 
Republic delegation was in favour with a Union with no real powers. They were afraid that through 
the Union, the Dutch Government could keep some influence regarding Indonesia.
138
 The UNCI was 
the body that interfered and came with options both parties could agree upon and right in time an 
agreement was reached.
139
 
Like aforementioned, the UNCI report which described the RTC agreement was received in the SC 
with enthusiasm. They praised the efforts of both parties and the role the SC had played, by means of 
                                                          
134
 UNSCOR, 455th meeting and 456th meeting (12 December 1949) 
135
 De Jong, Avondschot, 658-660 
136
 Idem 
137
 De Jong, Avondschot, 655-657; Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 30th meeting (6 December 1949) 822; 
UNSCOR, 455th mtg., 6 
138
 De Jong, Avondschot, 641-647 
139
 Idem, 649-653 
40 
 
the UNCI.
140
 The real debates before the SC about the Indonesian question came to its end. However, 
the actors were still playing different roles in discussing the RTC Agreement. Most of the time, the 
introduction of the speeches was merely the same, but the Republic and Dutch representatives each 
addressed the RTC agreement in a different way. 
  The Netherlands representative stayed put in the flow of arguments he had presented the SC 
regarding the competence of the SC. Therefore, he stated that the agreement about a settlement of the 
dispute could have been reached without help of the UN.
141
 He kept defending the domestic 
jurisdiction of the Netherlands until the end. With this argument he tried to point at the cooperative 
character of the Dutch authorities towards the SC. The Netherlands did believe that the SC had no 
competence, but they tried within their capabilities and responsibilities to comply with the resolutions.  
  Another argument that was apparent towards the whole debate was the claim of the Dutch 
representative that all the actions of the Dutch Government were executed in the name of the right of 
self-determination. They were concerned about the execution of this right after the sovereignty would 
be transferred to the Republic of United States of Indonesia. In an extra clause alongside the RTC 
agreement, the Dutch Government pledged that it would observe the right of self-determination in 
Indonesia. If it is considered that this right is on stake, the Dutch Government would do everything 
that lay within its power to implement the right.
142
 
  Not in direct response to the Dutch representative, but logically responsive to the 
responsibilities the Dutch Government had laid upon itself, the Republican representative stressed the 
real character of the sovereignty that was to be transferred to the Republic of United States of 
Indonesia. It claimed that the sovereign status of Indonesia would provide for the protection of 
Indonesia’s domestic affairs. The Netherlands would not have the right to interfere anymore, even 
when they held the view that the right of self-determination is at stake.
143
  
  Both viewpoints showed that both parties acted in compliance with the roles that were 
ascribed to them because of the earlier debates in the SC. The Dutch representative did this because he 
kept arguing about the responsibility of the Netherlands in Indonesia. He had done this a couple of 
times before when he acted like the role as rescuer. The Indonesian representative kept complying 
with the role as the victim of the dispute, because of the manner in which he stressed the sovereignty 
Indonesia would receive after the transfer of sovereignty from the Kingdom of the Netherlands. He 
seems to claim that after the transfer of sovereignty, no one would have the right to interfere in the 
domestic jurisdiction of Indonesia again. Finally, Indonesia would be independent and free from 
Dutch influence and suppression. 
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In contrary to the United States, Australia and India, who praised the developments in the Indonesian 
dispute’s settlement, the Soviet Union was the most persistent in its role as persecutor. According to 
the Soviet representative, the war in Indonesia was still going on and the Dutch forces were still 
suppressing the nationalist aspirations of the Indonesian people. His delegation submitted a resolution 
that pleaded for the abolishment of the UNCI and the establishment of a whole new SC commission in 
which every member of the Council was represented.
144
 He and the representative of Ukraine voted 
against the resolution that was supposed to congratulate the UNCI with its achievements and to 
encourage the commission to supervise the RTC agreement. For the Soviet representative this meant 
that the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution and the SC was not able to adopt it.
145
 This had no real 
influence on the activities of the UNCI, but it gave a statement to the SC and the UN, that one of the 
world powers did not approve with the procedure and policy of the SC towards the decolonisation of 
Indonesia. The reason for this disapproval is to be found in the evolving Cold War between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. The United States had a large influence in the settlement of the 
Indonesian dispute and the Government of Indonesia choose a kind of government that was more 
suitable in the Western world, instead of a communist regime.  
At December 27, 1949, the transfer of sovereignty from the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the 
independent Republic of the United States of Indonesia was signed by Queen Juliana and Mohamed 
Hatta in the Royal Palace in Amsterdam.
146 
 
  The transfer of sovereignty did not follow up an interim period in which the new state could 
build its own state-structure. The newly established Republic of the United States of Indonesia was 
built during one conference and practically structured from scratch. During the summer of 1950, it was 
no surprise that the leaders of the federal state decided to form a unitary state in Indonesia. This 
transformation was decided without the consultation of the Indonesian people by means of a 
plebiscite.
147
 Like aforementioned, the Dutch Parliament had adopted an extra clause besides the 
ratification of the Round Table Agreement that obliged the Dutch Government to monitor the 
execution of self-determination in Indonesia and to act when this self-determination was at stake. 
Therefore, the Dutch Government contacted the UNCI, who was not discharged yet and acquainted 
with the observation of the implementation of the Round Table Agreement, about the unification in 
combination with the right of self-determination. Despite the absence of a plebiscite, the UNCI 
reported that the unification did not threaten the right of self-determination of the Indonesian 
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people.
148
  
  It appears that the Dutch Government really felt responsible for the self-determination of the 
Indonesian people, a policy that was repeated throughout the debates in the Council. Despite the minor 
impact the unification of Indonesia had in the SC, the Dutch Government’s correspondence with the 
UNCI seems to show that the Dutch Government still wanted to prove the negative character of the 
Republic and the lack of representativeness they had. The unification without plebiscites could show 
that the role as rescuer, played by the Dutch Government during the debates, in particular about the 
right of self-determination in Indonesia, was more accurate than other Council members thought. 
However, it must be said that the action of the Dutch Government regarding the unification can also be 
explained from a point of view that the Dutch Government was trying to keep some influence in 
Indonesia and to undo the unification. The federalisation of Indonesia could be explained as one of the 
means to gain more influence and weaken the Republic, who were fighting against this influence.  
  Despite the Dutch questions, the aforementioned attempt to restore Dutch influence in 
Indonesia showed the results of the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia. Internal issues, like the 
unification, were not judged upon by the SC or UN. No one during the Council meeting that discussed 
the membership of Indonesia talked about the transformation in state-structure. The Republic of 
Indonesia became a sovereign state with its own internal issues that were to be respected by the 
internal community. 
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3. THE INDONESIAN DISPUTE: THE ACTORS 
AND THE CONCEPTS OF SOVEREIGNTY 
AND SELF-DETERMINATION 
 
The analysis of the actors in the SC debates about Indonesia showed that three roles were ascribed to 
the different actors. The representatives of Australia, India, and the Soviet Union were ascribed a role 
as persecutor; the representatives of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia both were ascribed 
a role as victim; and, the representative of the United States and, now and then, the representative of 
the Netherlands were ascribed a role as rescuer also. Next to this, the United States representative was 
also ascribed a role as persecutor following the second military action. And during the time the United 
States was playing the role as persecutor, Canada took over its role as rescuer. These different roles 
caused a certain way of interaction between the actors in the SC but also led to different viewpoints on 
and use of the concepts of self-determination and sovereignty. This chapter will analyse these different 
ways of use and viewpoints. 
  The chapter will be lain out in paragraphs that are arranged by theme. In these paragraphs an 
analysis will be made about the way the different actors, with their ascribed roles, adjust to the 
different subjects that came before the SC regarding the concepts of self-determination and 
sovereignty. At first, the subject of the competence of the SC in the Indonesian dispute will be 
analysed. Was the self-determination of Indonesia of concern by the SC or was it merely a case that 
lay within the domestic jurisdiction of the Netherlands? At second, the nature and status of the 
Republic will be discussed. This subject caused a lively discussion in the SC and showed up in all 
stages of the dispute. The commissions that were established by the SC in order to assist the settlement 
of the dispute will be discussed in the third paragraph of this chapter. In this paragraph an analysis will 
be made of the development in the SC considering the establishment of, at first, the GOC and further 
on the modification of the Committee into the UNCI. This subject was also acquainted with a lot of 
different opinions regarding the use of self-determination and sovereignty. The fourth paragraph will 
analyse the growing rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Why choose the Soviet 
Union to aggressively oppose the SC, the United States and its actions? At last, the manner will be 
discussed in which the different actors in the dispute used the debates for image forming at a global 
scale.  
THE COMPETENCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
Like aforementioned, the matter of competence already appeared in the debate when the SC discussed 
the complaint of the Ukrainian delegation regarding the behaviour of the British troops in Indonesia. 
44 
 
One of the arguments that was used by the Ukrainian representative was that the British troops used 
Japanese troops to suppress the national movement in Indonesia and with that suppressing the right of 
self-determination of the Indonesian people. It was stated that colonialism was over and that the 
former colonies had the right to gain independence. It was a major obligation of the UN and the SC to 
safeguard this right.
149
   
  In direct response to the alleged obligation of the UN to safeguard the right of self-
determination, the Netherlands and British representative argued that the self-determination of the 
Indonesian people was a case that lay within the domestic jurisdiction of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. Therefore, the Netherlands would undertake negotiations with the nationalist leaders and 
arrange the best way to settle the independence of Indonesia. The execution of the right of self-
determination of the Indonesian people was a responsibility that belonged to the Netherlands because 
of their sovereign status in Indonesia. The representative claimed that the Netherlands were supporting 
the right of self-determination of the Indonesian people. The SC expressed its faith in the good 
intentions of the Netherlands authorities and therefore the SC did not find it necessary to send a 
commission of enquiry.  
  The situation changed after the SC became acquainted with the launch of the first military 
action by the Netherlands authorities. Ascribed persecutors, Australia, India and the Soviet Union, 
demanded immediate action by the SC Like aforementioned, the different roles that were apparent 
during the debates in the SC showed also different approaches towards self-determination and 
sovereignty. As persecutors the representatives of Australia, India and the Soviet Union were of the 
opinion that the right of self-determination of Indonesia was threatened by the Netherlands. It is seen 
that Australia and India followed a different approach than the Soviet Union. However their request to 
the SC was in general the same. The different approach could be explained by the different 
motivations the three powers had for their standpoint in the SC. In chapter two it is mentioned that 
Australia and India were both young states who longed for an important place within international 
relations.
150
 India was even striving for the leadership in its own region, Southeast Asia.
151
 It fitted in 
their view on international relations and the UN to take a firm and frontrunner position regarding the 
case of Indonesia before the SC. However, unlike the Soviet Union, Australia and India benefitted 
from friendly relations with Western states and followed a more impartial policy regarding the actions 
of the SC.  
  In contrast with Australia and India, the Soviet Union had already required a place as ‘ world 
power’ within international relations. However, its persecuting standpoint originated in the 
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communist’s civilizing program based on stages of human development founded by Marx.152 
Therefore, the Soviet Union protracted itself as the defender of colonial people dependent on Western 
administration. Namely, the Soviet regime held the view that every part of the Union stood in an equal 
manner in connection with one another.
153
 The Soviet Union was of the opinion that colonialism was 
wrong and tried to win over international public opinion in favour of their own civilizing mission by 
supporting Western colonies becoming independent.    
  It is seen that an intervention by the SC would be a violation of the Charter, according to the 
Netherlands.
154
 Thus, the representative was claiming that the sovereign integrity of the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands was threatened in Indonesia. The representative victimized the Dutch Government as 
being disrespected by the SC regarding their internal affairs. The representative used the concept of 
sovereignty in order to try to persuade the SC to stay out of the Indonesian dispute. The speeches of 
many representatives in the SC had already proved that many of these representatives would be in 
favour of the independence of Indonesia with the Indonesia Republic as its government. However, it is 
mentioned that the Netherlands –like other European powers with colonies- though that they were 
dependent on their colonies to restore their economies after the war. The Indonesian Republic had 
already made public that it was not in favour of prolonging close relations with the Netherlands during 
its independence. Therefore, the Dutch Government regarded it as necessary to eliminate or weaken 
the Republic and persuade the SC that it had no competence.  
  During the debate following the first military action, the representative of the Netherlands was 
backed by several Council members, like France, Belgium and the United Kingdom. It was unlikely 
that without the support of these representatives, the proposed resolution about the cessation of 
hostilities would be adopted by the SC. Therefore, the United States representative proposed to only 
call for the cessation of hostilities and leave out the notion of a violation of the charter by the 
Netherlands authorities. In this manner, the SC could interfere in the dispute without intervening the 
sovereign integrity of the Netherlands. In the same spirit the GOC was established by the SC. The SC 
did interfere in the dispute, but with minor matters and with an advisory spirit.
155
  
  The United States was benefiting from its moderate position as rescuer, because it was 
dependent in its rivalry against the Soviet Union from the European powers. Besides that, the United 
States possessed several military naval bases and enclaves that were situated in territories that could be 
described as colonies. A strong opinion against the empirical policies of the European states was not 
favourable regarding this strategy.
156
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The argument of competence and sovereign integrity did prove to be successful for the Netherlands 
authorities as long as the United States was supporting the plans of the Netherlands regarding the final 
settlement. When the United States authorities, especially the State Department, were losing faith in 
the good intentions and the ability of the Netherlands authorities to come to a final agreement, the 
attitude and policy of the United States changed. The representative stated clearly that the United 
States was of opinion that the SC had competence to not only deal with the military situation in 
Indonesia but also with the manner of Indonesian independency. This change of attitude caused a 
change in policy of the SC, which was already asked for by, mainly, the representatives of Australia, 
India and the Republic after the launch of the first military action, and after the signing of the 
‘Renville’ agreement.  
  The Netherlands representative kept his opinion that the SC was not competent and stated 
during the discussion in the SC about the RTC Agreement that without the help of the UN, Indonesia 
would also have become independent.
157
  
Analysing the debates regarding the competence of the SC it appears that the Netherlands authorities 
viewed the concepts of sovereignty and self-determination each in a different aspect. It held the view 
that international relations and law and with that the Charter of the UN were based upon the principle 
of sovereignty. Like it is explain in the first chapter, in theory they were right.
158
 In their view, the 
execution of self-determination lies within the boundaries of this sovereignty. The self-determination 
of a colony like the Netherlands Indies was of concern of the administrating power, the Netherlands 
Government. The Western powers, like the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium, 
were supporting the same policy. At first, the other members of the SC, except the Soviet bloc, held 
also the same view. However, the use of military action was seen as a colonial manner to suppress 
people that were openly opposed to the policy of the administrating power.
159
 The SC members were 
not of the opinion that the right of self-determination was, in the first place, a matter that should be 
handled by the SC as a positive right. They just did not trust the Netherlands authorities in granting the 
Netherlands-Indies independence anymore. India, among others, stated that the Netherlands was 
fighting a colonial war.
160
 Because of this attitude, the Netherlands kept trying to present their case as 
if they were using military action to protect the national aspirations of the Indonesian people against a 
Republic that was filled with ‘extremist elements’ and did not represent the whole Indonesian people 
considering its claim to self-determination. This policy will become clearer during the analysis of the 
different views regarding the nature and status of the Republic of Indonesia. 
THE NATURE AND STATUS OF THE INDONESIAN REPUBLIC 
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Like the debate about the competence of the SC, the debate about the nature and status of the Republic 
also started already during the discussions following the Ukrainian complaint. During that debate, the 
Dutch representative and the British representative held the view that the Republic represented a 
movement that was established by the Japanese and was trained in “Nazi business”.161 The leader of 
the Republic, Sukarno had indeed worked together with the Japanese during the occupation, but other 
leaders, like Hatta, did condemn the cooperation with the Japanese and were favouring the support of 
Western states during their struggle towards independence.
162
 The Dutch representative stated before 
the SC that negotiations were planned to take place. However, a lot of foreign pressure from the 
United Kingdom and the United States was needed to let the Dutch Government approve that the 
negotiations contained talks with Sukarno.
163
 Throughout the whole Indonesian dispute this aversion 
against the Republic had an influence on the policy of the Dutch Government. The first military action 
was launched to regain order and safety in the Republican area and to safeguard the national 
aspirations of the, so-believed, ‘normal’ Indonesian people who did not sympathize with the 
Republic.
164
 The ‘Renville’ agreement was violated by the establishment of federal states because it 
was believed that Indonesia needed other states to strengthen the federalists in order to provide for an 
alternative for the Republic.
165
 The second military action was launched to abolish the Republic 
entirely in order to precede negotiations with the federalists.
166
 The following SC resolutions were 
neglected because the Netherlands authorities held the view that the release of the Republican leaders 
would threaten the safety and order in Indonesia and would not contribute to the quick settlement of 
the dispute.
167
 Thus, from the start of the dispute until the end, the Dutch authorities were reluctant to 
cooperate with the Republic and did not view the Republic as the embodiment of the national 
aspirations of the Indonesian people Like aforementioned, the underlying idea of this policy was not in 
the first place the real nature of the Republic, but the lack of opportunities in the long term the Dutch 
Government envisioned regarding cooperation with the Republic. The concept of self-determination 
used in a way compatible with a role as rescuer was not entirely used in benefit of the aspirations of 
the Indonesian people. If the SC had believed the line of arguments as presented by the Dutch 
representative, the United States and the SC would have handled differently. If the SC-members had 
agreed with the Dutch representative, the SC would not have problems with the use of military force 
against alleged terrorists. The case of Vietnam is an example of a different outcome.       However, 
most of the members of the SC held a different view than the Dutch authorities. They saw the 
Indonesian Republic as the right means for Indonesia to become independent. It is seen that the United 
States were at the first place trying to find a compromise that would contribute to both parties. They 
                                                          
161
 UNSCOR, 2
nd
 mtg., 17; UNSCOR, 12
th
 mtg., 180  
162
 Van den Doel, Afscheid van Indië, 30 
163
 Taylor McDonald, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, 20-21 
164
 UNSCOR, 171st mtg., 1640-1645 
165
 UNSCOR, 256
th
 mtg., 304-310 
166
 De Jong, Avondschot, 253 
167
 UNSCOR, 388
th
 mtg., 2-31 
48 
 
were of the opinion that the Netherlands’ presence in Indonesia was essential for the right settlement 
of the dispute.
168
 With adopting this policy, the representative of the United States adopted an attitude 
that was compatible with a role as rescuer in the debate and tried to support the self-determination of 
Indonesia without violating the sovereign integrity of the Netherlands. Although, the United States 
decided to drop its role as rescuer when it changed its opinion about the leadership of the Republicans. 
After the communist revolt and the successful repression by the Republican Government, the United 
States did no longer doubt the capability of providing for law and order of  the Government of the. It 
considered itself obligated to support the pro-Western cabinet of Hatta in order to safeguard Indonesia 
from any communist influence. The United States became confident that the Republic was 
representative for the self-determination of Indonesia and consistent with Western customs and values. 
It appears that the self-determination of Indonesia became more important than the alleged violation of 
the sovereign integrity of the Netherlands.
169
         
  The Soviet Union did support the Republic as being the embodiment of Indonesian self-
determination already from the start of the dispute. However, when the Republican Government 
repressed the communist revolt, the Soviet Union experienced some difficulties concerning their 
policy. The Soviet Union proclaimed itself as the advocate of the right of self-determination for 
dependent and suppressed people, but it was also acquainted with a developing diplomatic war 
between the Western, Capitalistic part of the world and the Communists. The Government that was 
seen as the embodiment of dependent people seeking for its right of self-determination repressed a 
communist party and its rising. They could not openly support the Hatta cabinet, but they also could 
not speak out against the Republican Government. A solution was found by accusing the United States 
of striking down the revolt instead of the Republican Government.
170
 From that moment, the tensions 
between the United States and the Soviet Union became clearly visible and sounded almost personal.    
THE UNITED NATIONS’ COMMISSIONS 
. Like it is described in the second chapter, the SC established two commissions, the GOC and the 
Consular Commission. The GOC changed into the UNCI after the launch of the second military 
action. The choice for a GOC instead of an arbitrary commission and the change from Good Offices to 
the UNCI, in particular, is of importance regarding the viewpoints of self-determination and 
sovereignty. 
  The establishment of the GOC evolved from the offer of good offices from the United States 
to the Dutch and Republican Governments -the offer was refused by the Republic- and the request 
from the Republic to establish two commissions, one that would arbitrate between the two parties and 
one that would supervise the cease fire resolution.
171
 The arbitration commission did not receive the 
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right amount of support from the SC, because of the competence of the SC, like it was presented 
before. Despite the matter of competence, the Dutch representative did not openly oppose the 
establishment of the GOC. J.J.P. de Jong is of the opinion that the Netherlands had insinuated the 
establishment of such a commission.
172
 However, the representative kept repeatedly stressing the 
character of the GOC, which was giving good offices and nothing else. It sounds strange that the 
Netherlands were challenging the competence of the SC and in the same time suggesting the 
establishment of a Committee that would interfere in the Indonesian dispute. However, throughout the 
whole debate it is apparent that the Dutch representative was trying to convince the SC of the good 
intentions of the Dutch Government. To suggest the establishment of a commission that because of its 
nature was of no harm to the sovereign integrity of the Netherlands could create the goodwill in the 
SC, the Netherlands were longing for. By supporting the establishment of the GOC, the Netherlands 
representative showed that the Dutch Government was really intending to grant Indonesia its 
independence.  
  The establishment of the Consular Commission, which had the task to supervise the cease-fire 
between the Indonesian and Dutch troops, was asked for by the Republican delegation. However, its 
structure -the career consuls, who were present in Indonesia, would report on the situation regarding 
the cease fire order to the SC- was suggested by the Dutch delegation. The structure of this 
commission did adapt to the already present situation in Indonesia. Therefore, it was not needed to 
send an extra external commission towards Indonesia. This matter could be favoured by the Dutch 
Government, because it would not change the situation in Indonesia. The Soviet representative was of 
opinion that this structure would cause an unreliable point of view from career consuls that were 
already in favour of the Dutch position in Indonesia.
173
  
  The coming into force of the GOC took a lot more time than the Consular Commission needed 
to report about the implementation of the cease fire order of the SC. The Consular Commission came 
to the conclusion that the cease fire was not fully implemented yet and neither of the parties undertook 
action to come to an agreement about the cease-fire. The SC decided that the Consular Commission 
and the GOC should work together to find a solution to the problem.
174
 The instigation towards a 
solution of the problem was made by the signing of the Renville agreement. The report of the GOC to 
the SC informed the Council about this agreement and during the Council meeting, the members of the 
GOC were given a change to give their view on the signed agreement. In particular, the Australian 
member of the GOC was of the opinion that the GOC had not enough powers to handle the Indonesian 
dispute to satisfaction. Because of its nature of good offices, the Dutch influence in the GOC was 
disadvantageous for the Indonesian standpoint in the negotiations. Therefore, the Republic had to 
make huge concessions in order to come to an agreement. These concessions were mainly focussed on 
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the status of the Republic. The dissolution of the Linggadjati agreement provided a chance for the 
Republic to claim its own independent status it had claimed during its declaration of independence. 
The signing of Renville meant to the Republic that it abandoned its claim for sovereignty and 
independence and, therefore, diminished itself to be a part of the federal United States of Indonesia 
without rights to establish foreign relations and to keep its own army. Namely, like it is described in 
the first chapter, these rights belonged to an independent state. The Dutch Government would remain 
the sovereign authority in Indonesian during the interim period.
175
  
  However, when analysing the meaning of the Renville agreement for the status of the 
Indonesian Republic, the question rises why the Republic agreed with the provisions of the Renville 
agreement in the first place. During the negotiations about the future status of the Republic, the United 
States’ member of the GOC had promised the delegation of the Republic that Renville would not 
change the status of the Republic, in contrary of the opinion that was expressed by the Dutch 
delegation. However, the Netherlands delegation was surprised by the change and did sign the 
agreement despite the notion that was submitted by the GOC that the acceptance of the Renville 
conditions could not change the status of parties.
176
 The Dutch party claimed that it had a sovereign 
status in Indonesia and the Republic claimed the same. Before it was signed, the Renville agreement 
became, like the Linggadjati agreement, also a dual agreement. This duality would have a negative 
influence on the negotiations that took place following the Renville agreement. Like it is seen in the 
second chapter this resulted in the launch of the second military action by the Netherlands.    
  It can be said that the lack of machinery of the GOC caused the establishment of a second dual 
agreement and the launch of the second military action. The absence of arbitrary powers forced the 
GOC to make promises that undermined the understanding between the two parties. However, the way 
the negotiations took place and in which manner the agreements were signed and ratified is more to 
blame. Most of the time, the Dutch delegation in Indonesia had a more rational approach to the dispute 
than the Dutch Government at home. The Indonesian Republic experienced the same problems.  
  Because of the internal problems of the Republic, the State Department held the view that the 
Republic was not stable enough to stand on its own and favoured a large involvement from the 
Netherlands in the final settlement of Indonesian independence. This point of view did pass on in the 
policy of the GOC and made an agreement like Renville possible.
177
 Like aforementioned, this policy 
changed when the newly formed Hatta cabinet showed the world community it was able to defend 
itself against communist influence and to strike down the Madiun revolt. Therefore, the United States 
changed their policy and started to support the Republic instead of the Netherlands. This change made 
it possible that after the launch of the second military action, the GOC could extend its machinery and 
could transform into a commission with arbitrary powers. These extra powers gave the commission 
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the possibility to force upon the Netherlands the restoration of the Republic and to direct the Round 
Table Conference towards a satisfactory agreement. Therefore, the role as rescuer as played by the 
United States was determined by the course of events during the Indonesian dispute. When the United 
States decided that the claim for self-determination of the Republic for Indonesia was stable enough, it 
decided to support its claim. The choice to rather support the Dutch Government or the Republic 
depended on the stabilising factor of the actions that were executed by the two Governments. Upon 
this stabilising factor the representative and delegation of the United States adopted rather an attitude 
as rescuer or as persecutor regarding the two parties. Before the Madiun revolt, the United States was 
of the opinion that the Netherlands had to provide for stability, because the Republic was not able to 
do this. Therefore, in order to create a stable Indonesia, the United States held the view that the 
Netherlands authorities should guide the Indonesian people towards independence. Abandonment by 
the Netherlands was because of this policy undesirable.
178
   
It is seen that during the work of the SC commissions the United States held the view that the stability 
in Indonesia was a major importance for the way the Indonesian people would be granted 
independence. Therefore, it had chosen to either support the sovereign responsibility of the Dutch 
Government or the positive right of self-determination by the Republic.  
  Other points of view about self-determination and sovereignty were also visible regarding the 
SC commissions and the Renville agreement. The negotiations between the Republic and the Dutch 
delegation reached a dead lock regarding the status of the Republic and other provisions that would 
degenerate de Republic into a minor state within the United States of Indonesia.
179
 This shows that the 
Republic and the Netherlands had both a different view upon the way the right of self-determination 
should be executed by Indonesia. The Netherlands were of opinion that the Republic was not 
representative for the whole of Indonesia and held the view that the establishment of a federal state 
would be more beneficiary for the self-determination of all the inhabitants of Indonesia.
180
 In contrast, 
the Republic supported the view that they were representative for the whole archipelago and not only 
Java, Sumatra and Madura. They agreed with the establishment of a United States of Indonesia, but 
preferred a unitary state. The Republic held the view that the Dutch Government preferred a federal 
Indonesia because of its ‘divide and conquer’ policy.181  
  Regarding its attitude towards the policy of the Netherlands, the arguments of the Republic 
delegation kept showing the characteristics of a role as victim in the debate. The self-determination of 
the Republic was threatened by the Dutch Government. In contrast, the Netherlands adopted in this 
situation an attitude that was compatible with a role as rescuer, different regarding the situation in 
which it challenged the competence of the SC and in which it used a line of arguments that were 
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compatible with a role as victim. Because of this role, the Dutch Government would present itself as 
saving the right of self-determination for the whole of Indonesia and saving the Indonesians from the 
terror of the Republic. The eventual establishment of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia 
with the cooperation of the UNCI, showed that the SC did, partially, agreed with the federal policy of 
the Netherlands and overlooked the unitary aspirations of the Republic. The choice to support a large 
part of the policy and ideas of the Dutch Government regarding the settlement of the Indonesian 
question, gave the Soviet Union an excuse to accuse the United States and later on the whole SC to 
work together with the Dutch Government to restore colonial rule in Indonesia. The growing conflict 
between the Soviet Union and the United States will be further elaborated in the next paragraph.     
THE COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION 
Next to the themes discussed before, which were in direct concern of the Indonesian dispute, also 
other developments, like the Cold War and the process of decolonisation, did influence the debate in 
the SC and the ways of use of the concepts of self-determination and sovereignty. Like described in 
the first chapter, the concept of self-determination was used by Lenin, before the concept became 
apparent in the speeches of President Wilson. The two major world powers were already fighting for 
the public opinion of Europe and the world before the Indonesian dispute even started. The concept of 
self-determination was a major subject of this growing rivalry. Like aforementioned, the Soviet Union 
presented itself increasingly as the advocate for dependent people fighting for their right of self-
determination. 
  During the period the Indonesian question was issued by the SC, the tension between the 
Soviet Union and the United States developed into a diplomatic war, centred around spheres of 
influenced and a large scale arms race.
182
 Combining the growing spheres of influence, the evolving 
process of decolonisation, and the role as advocate for the right of self-determination for dependent 
peoples adopted by the Soviet Union, the struggle for independence of Indonesia could be an 
important platform to bring these growing tensions to practise.   
  The statement, made by the representative of Ukraine, about the suppression of the national 
movement of Indonesia and his claim to be an advocate for all dependent people in the world, put the 
United States in a delicate position. It was against sustaining the system of colonial empires. However, 
its major alleys were Western powers that were of the opinion that their colonies would help them to 
recover from the Second World War.
183
 Therefore, the United States did not have the position to 
openly oppose imperialism and promote the self-determination of colonial people. 
  On the other side, all members of the SC presented the opinion that the colonial era had come 
to an end, including the Western powers that were still administrating overseas empires.
184
 This did 
not mean that the UN, or the international community, would force every administrating power to let 
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go of their colonies immediately. Like it is mentioned in the first chapter, the right of self-
determination was included in the Charter of the UN as a future goal and not an established right. The 
debate in the SC about the Ukrainian complaint showed that the concept of self-determination was 
seen as a negative right that was to be granted by the administrating power. However, the evolvement 
of the Indonesian dispute in the debates following the first and second military actions showed that if 
an administrating power is not willing to grant its colony independence, the foreign community would 
intervene. The Indonesian dispute showed that, at first, this intervention was established with care for 
the sovereign integrity of the administrating power. Further in the process, the intervention became 
stronger and moved past notions of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction. It all depended on the 
degree of co-operation shown by the administrating power.  
  Thus, in the first place, self-determination for colonial people did not become a positive right 
at once. States were allowed to keep their colonies. However, once the colonial people had expressed 
their wishes to become independent, the administrating power had no right to suppress these 
nationalist aspirations anymore due to opposing public opinion. To be clear, this idea confined itself to 
colonial people who had national aspirations that matched with Western ideas. The case of Vietnam is 
an example that proved that not all suppression was put to a hold by the SC or UN and that the nature 
of a nationalist movement was of major importance for the foreign support a wish for self-
determination was given.  
The aforementioned developments were visible in the debates in the SC about the Indonesian 
Question. It would explain a large part of the interaction between the United States and the Soviet 
Union in the debates about the dispute. The United States’ involvement in the Indonesian question, 
with its offer of Good Offices and its membership of the GOC, were a threat to the policy of the Soviet 
Union regarding the advocacy for the independence of colonial people. If the United States would 
successfully support the settlement of the dispute, it would widen its sphere of influence from the 
already pro-Western Philippines, to Indonesia. Therefore, the Soviet representative tried to put the 
United States into a bad light, and stated that the United States and later also the UN, during that 
period a machinery that was largely influenced by the United States, were providing the resources and 
the support for the Dutch to restore colonial rule in Indonesia. The Soviet Union used its ascribed role 
as persecutor in the debates as a way to strengthen its own argument as advocate of the dependent 
people in the world. However, it experienced similar controversies while implementing its policy. Like 
the United States had to find the right approach towards Western empires, the Soviet Union had to 
develop a policy towards national movements which were longing for Western capitalism and 
democracy.  
  The Government of the Indonesian Republic consisted of different parties and one of these 
parties was a left wing, communist party. Members of this party attended the Government of the 
Republic until Sukarno installed a moderate Cabinet, led by prime-minister Hatta. The party 
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radicalized and started the Madiun revolt, which was repressed by the Republican Government 
itself.
185
 With this action, the Republican Government choose openly to pursue a Western style of 
government and choose to stay out of the Soviet sphere of influence. Openly disapproving with the 
actions of the Republican Government would harm the Soviet Union’s foreign policy. On the other 
side, doing nothing to support the communists in Indonesia would also harm the Soviet Union’s 
policy. Like it is mentioned before, to save face, the Soviet Union accused the United States of 
repressing the revolt and therefore the self-determination of the Indonesian communists. The use of 
the principle of self-determination in foreign affairs by the United States and the Soviet Union proved 
to lead to difficult choices, for example, how to support a people that claimed their right to self-
determination but did not favour a type of government that is compatible with rather the United States’ 
ideology or the Soviet Union’s ideology?         
IMAGE BUILDING AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
The paragraph above showed, besides the Indonesian dispute, also other subjects were apparent during 
the debates about the Indonesian question. This suggests that more than only the contents of the 
dispute were at stake during the debates. When a comparison is made between the presentation of the 
several representatives in the debates before the SC and the situation in their countries and 
governments at home, a different approach is visible concerning the concepts of self-determination 
and sovereignty. This different approach does not aim at a difference in definition but rather a different 
way of use of the two concepts. The phraseology of the representatives at the Council table suggests 
that the debates were merely diplomatic and image building was an important subject in the purpose of 
these debates. Like it is seen in the previous paragraph, the United States and the Soviet Union had to 
be careful about what to say and support in order to sustain their reliability. The United States had 
openly claimed that it was against colonialism and imperialism, but it was dependent on its allies, the 
Western empires, to make a stand against the growing sphere of influence of the Soviet Union.  
  However, the cold war and the end of an era of colonialism was not the only factor that 
showed the importance of image building in the SC regarding the Indonesian dispute. For the both 
striving parties, the SC debates were a way to convince the Council of their goodwill and their right. 
With stressing their own good intentions and stressing the misbehaviour of their opponents, both 
parties tried to win over the sympathy of the Council members and with that the sympathy of the 
international community. This sympathy could lead to a favourable intervention or non-intervention 
by the SC.    
  Other members, like the representative of India, stressed the important obligation the SC had 
regarding the Indonesian dispute. He also stressed the consequences a lack of decisiveness would have 
on the image of the SC in the international community.
186
 This argument of indecisiveness was also 
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used against the arguments of the Netherlands about the competence of the SC. The representative of 
Australia accused the Netherlands of deliberately delaying the decision-making-process in the SC. The 
delay would also damage the prestige of the SC.
187
  
Concluding the analysis of the use of the principles of sovereignty and self-determination by the 
different roles adopted by the different actors in the Indonesian dispute, it can be said that the concepts 
were not used in a legal way. About the legal definition, the opinions were not really divided. Even the 
legal arguments the Netherlands representative put forward about the competence of the SC were not 
used in a legalistic way. Only the request for a judgement on the competence of the SC from the 
International Court of Justice can be called legalistic. The other ways of use of the two concepts are 
merely diplomatic and political. Because of this political way of use, the concepts of self-
determination and sovereignty were used in order to win over the sympathy of the international 
community and served national purposes rather than international ones. During the 396
th
 meeting of 
the SC the Australian representative spoke out his anger about this fact. He said that:  
“We have tried to make the Security Council work, but, despite what has been said this afternoon, we 
feel that it has failed mainly through the play of, or reliance upon, national interests instead of real 
international truth and justice. […..] There had therefore been a loss of faith; we see a destruction of 
hope in the world; we see it largely as a result of the failure of the Security Council.”188  
The representative stressed just the problem that appeared during the analysis of the Indonesian 
dispute in the debates in the SC. Every actor adopted another role, a role that suited the best with 
which was to be accomplished. With the start of the era of decolonisation, the concept of self-
determination was popular to use in order to invoke sympathy from the international public opinion. 
The concept of sovereignty appeared to be only useful to some extend regarding cases of 
decolonisation. By means of using sovereignty and self-determination in a political way like this, the 
debate about the Indonesian dispute in the SC became a role-play between different actors that were 
merely concerned with their own policy and the prestige of the newly established world organisation, 
than finding a quick practical solution for the settlement of the Indonesian dispute. It can be said that 
the way of use of the two concepts partially caused the exhausting progression of the Indonesian 
dispute.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
The analysis of the discussions in the SC by means of the ascription of three roles shows that 
the debates were subject to many different viewpoints and standpoints regarding the 
Indonesian dispute. Each phase in the dispute was characterised by its own themes. However 
many appeared throughout the whole dispute. The principles of self-determination and 
sovereignty played an important role considering these themes. 
  The first chapter of this thesis discussed the definitions of sovereignty and self-
determination; the debate that evolved with the entrance of the principle of self-determination 
in international relations; and, the implementation of both the principles in the Charter of the 
UN. It was shown that determining a precise definition is nearly impossible, especially in 
practice. Next to that, the principles were highly influenced by the developments in world 
politics, like democratisation and human rights, decolonisation and the evolving Cold War. 
Because of these developments the UN was obliged to include the notion of the right of self-
determination in the Charter of the UN. It was decided to add the principle to the Article 
dealing with the purposes of the UN. It was shown that implementing the principle as a 
purpose of the UN, self-determination was in theory not intended to be as a foundational 
principles. 
  An important difference regarding the negative versus positive and internal versus 
external right of self-determination in relation to the concept of sovereignty was also issued. 
Internal self-determination and the concept of self-determination as a negative right did not 
cause a lot of problems regarding sovereignty. In contrast, external self-determination and the 
concept of self-determination as positive right stood in opposite of international relation 
founded on this sovereignty. Regarding colonial people, this relation was not seen as 
problematic from the viewpoints of authors who wrote their work after the adoption of 
resolution 1514 (1960) Of the General Assembly, which stated that colonial people had the 
right to become independent. 
The second chapter of this thesis showed that the execution of the right of self-determination 
as a positive right for colonial people was not implemented by every member of the SC yet. 
The inclusion of the right of self-determination in the Charter as a purpose in combination 
with the lack of experience with the execution of self-determination as a positive right caused 
a lengthy debate in the SC about the Council’s competence in the Indonesian dispute. 
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Regarding these debates several actors were identified and their interaction was analysed by 
means of the three different roles of the drama triangle. The attribution of these roles to the 
actors of the debates showed also the interaction and standpoints that were presented by the 
actors.  
  The Indonesian and Dutch representatives both acted like the victim in the debates in 
the SC. However, in consideration of certain events both representatives changed their line of 
arguments from a role as victim to, respectively, a role as rescuer or as persecutor. Both 
representatives chose these lines of arguments in order to win over the sympathy of the SC. 
This was important for both representatives because it would have help their governments to 
arrange the settlement of the conflict in their own preferred way. The Dutch Government 
preferred to settle the Indonesian dispute without foreign interference and, in contrast, the 
Indonesian Republic would benefit from an intervention by the UN. 
  Two other representatives that also would benefit from this sympahty were the 
representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States. It is seen that from the end of the 
First World War, the Soviet Union and the United States were fighting for the favour of the 
world’s public opinion. In order to win over the public opinion in the SC the representative of 
the Soviet Union used a line of arguments that was similar with the role of persecutor. From 
the start of the debate about the Indonesian dispute, the Soviet Union pointed at the 
Netherlands as the aggressor and the offender in the dispute. These allegations suited with its 
self-acclaimed role as advocate of the execution of the right of self-determination of 
dependent peoples, and in particular the colonial people. 
  In contrast with the Soviet representative, the United States’ representative used a 
moderate approach towards the dispute. Therefore, the line of arguments showed by the 
United States was seen as compatible with a role as rescuer. However, when the Dutch 
Government decided not to listen to the United States Government, it changed its line of 
arguments into an approach that was more compatible with a role as persecutor. During that 
period, the Canadian representative took the rescuer role over from the United States and 
directed the SC towards more constructive action. 
  The other ‘persecutors’ in the dispute, the Australian and Indian representatives, did 
not change their line of arguments like the Soviet representative. However, Australia and 
India did only act as persecutors when necessary. The Soviet Union went through with its 
accusatory line of arguments even after the signing of the RTC agreement.  
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Following the identification of the main actors and their interaction, the third chapter of this 
thesis analysed the different viewpoints and ways of use of the concepts of self-determination 
and sovereignty that resulted from the interaction between the main actors and their position 
towards the Indonesian dispute. 
  In the second chapter it is seen that the main actors were eager to acquire the sympathy 
of the SC for their case. In order to accomplish their task, the representatives used the 
concepts of self-determination and sovereignty in a mainly diplomatic and political way rather 
than a legal way.  
  The Dutch representative used the two concepts respectively to win over the goodwill 
of the Security Council -all measures were taken in benefit of the execution of self-
determination- and to exclude the SC from real intervention in the Indonesian dispute -the SC 
was violating the Charter with implying the establishment of an arbitrary commission-. The 
Republican representative used the two concepts respectively to include the international 
community in the finding of a settlement for the Indonesian dispute -the SC was requested to 
intervene by the Republican Government- and to prove its ability to exercise authority over 
Indonesia -to provide for law and order was one of the criteria of statehood-.  
  The representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States were concerned with an 
even broader audience to convince about their good intention about how to govern the world. 
The United States benefitted from a warm relation with the European powers and had to be 
careful in making statements that would judge over the administration of colonial areas. 
Therefore, the United States did not oppose the Netherlands in the first place. The matter of 
stability was an important argument that changed this attitude. It seems that the strategy of the 
Republic had worked.  
  In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union expressed from the beginning of the 
debates a strong condemnation of the actions of the Netherlands and later also the United 
States. He used the concept of self-determination to try to stress the colonial policy of the 
Netherlands and the United States in order to win over the sympathy of the newly established 
former colonial states. This attitude forced the United States to adopt a role as persecutor 
towards the Netherlands representative following the second military action.    
In order to return to the main question of this thesis, following the analysis of the main actors, 
their interaction and the ways of use of the concepts of self-determination and sovereignty it 
can be said that the role of these two concepts were of main concern with the image building 
activities in the debates about the Indonesian dispute in the SC in connection with the national 
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interests of the actors. The two concepts were of major influence during the establishment of 
the Charter and also in practice for the UN. It was impossible for the representatives to object 
the notions about the concept of self-determination as a right for colonial people. On the other 
hand, it was also impossible to deny the importance and legal position of the concept of 
sovereignty. Because of the impossibility to ignore the two concepts, the different actors in 
the dispute could use the concepts in benefit for their own agendas. However, the Republic of 
Indonesia proved to have acquired more help from the use of the two concepts in their 
arguments in comparison with the Netherlands. The Republic appealed to the SC to assist 
with the execution of the right of self-determination for the people of Indonesia and the 
requirement of full sovereignty over the archipelago. Ignoring a request like this, would 
negatively influence the prestige of the SC. Therefore, in the end, the Netherlands 
Government was forced to settle its dispute with the Republic Government and transfer its 
sovereignty to the Republic of United States of Indonesia.  
  It can be said that the role that was played by the principles of self-determination and 
sovereignty did appeared to be a role that was not constructive thorough. The popularity of 
the principle of self-determination gave the Republic of Indonesia a platform to defend its 
claim to execute the right of self-determination. However, it is seen that different, other 
viewpoints and ways of use of the principle could also led to disagreement and prolonging of 
the dispute. The same could be said about the principle of sovereignty. Even Australia and 
India openly stated that the principle was used to prolong the discussion in order to delay a 
decision. Concluding this analysis, it is seen that the political use of –at first- primary legalist 
terms and rights could cause the prolonging of discussions and even a dispute. To end with 
the words of the Australian representative: 
“ ….the Security Council […] has failed mainly through the play of, or reliance upon, national 
interests instead of real international truth and justice.” 
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Documents: S/1270, S/1431 
Fifth Year (1950) 
503 mtg.  
Document: S/1809 
  Sixth Year (1951) 
   Document: S/2087 
 
Charter of the United Nations 
  Chapter I: Article 1 
    Article 2 
  Chapter V: Article 32 
  Chapter VI: Article 34 
    Article 35 
  Chapter VII: Article 39 
    Article 40  
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